Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 4:24-CR-260-1

Before Wiener, Willett, and Wilson, Circuit Judges .

Per Curiam:

Jaterron Williamson appeals his conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He contends that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional because it violates the Second Amendment as applied to him and exceeds Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause. The Government has filed an opposed motion for summary affirmance or, alternatively, for an extension of time to file a brief. Though Williamson's appeal can be resolved without further briefing, summary Page 2affirmance is not appropriate. See Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis , 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969).

Relying on New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen , 597 U.S. 1, 24 (2022), and United States v. Diaz , 116 F.4th 458 (5th Cir. 2024), cert. denied , 145 S. Ct. 2822 (2025), Williamson contends that § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment as applied to him because his prior felony offenses are not analogous to any colonial era offense punishable by execution or estate forfeiture. He asserts that because the district court erroneously concluded that preBruen caselaw foreclosed his Second Amendment challenge, we should remand the case for the district court to apply the correct legal framework in the first instance. We do not agree.

Williamson had three prior felony convictions for “Deadly Conduct – Discharge Firearm at Individual.” These offenses are closely analogous to the deadly conduct conviction that we relied on, in part, to reject an asapplied challenge to § 922(g)(1) in United States v. Reyes , 141 F.4th 682, 686– 87 & n.9 (5th Cir. 2025). Although Williamson suggests that Reyes and a line of similar cases were wrongly decided, it is well-settled that one panel of this court 'may not overturn another panel's decision, absent an intervening change in the law, such as by a statutory amendment, or the Supreme Court, or [the] en banc court.” Jacobs v. Nat’l Drug Intelligence Ctr ., 548 F.3d 375, 378 (5th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, Williamson’s as-applied challenge fails. See id. at 687. Additionally, Williamson correctly concedes that his Commerce Clause challenge is foreclosed. See United States v. Alcantar , 733 F.3d 143, 145–46 (5th Cir. 2013).

For these reasons, the Government’s opposed motion for summary affirmance is DENIED ; its alternative motion for an extension of time to file a brief is also DENIED, as unnecessary. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED .

Page 3Don R. Willett , Circuit Judge , joined by Cory T. Wilson , Circuit Judge , concurring:

Each of Williamson’s constitutional challenges to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) fails under binding circuit precedent. We have squarely rejected both enumerated-powers and facial Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1).¹ And the logic of our decision in United States v. Reyes dooms Williamson's as-applied Second Amendment challenge as well.² I therefore join the majority opinion, which faithfully applies our rule of orderliness to reject each of Williamson’s arguments.

Even so, I remain doubtful that our precedent rejecting enumerated-powers challenges to § 922(g)(1) was correctly decided.³ As a threshold matter, “Congress has no power to enact a comprehensive criminal code, . . . § 922[(g)], like every other federal statute, must be based on one or more of Congress’s powers enumerated in the Constitution.'⁴ The Page 4Interstate Commerce Clause 5 is a 'natural first place to look.'⁶ But the Clause's original meaning-adherence to which is '[t]he first and most important rule in constitutional interpretation'⁷ -does not support § 922(g)(1).

Consider the ratification debates. How could the Federalists have assured skeptics that Congress lacked power to infringe individual rights 8 including the right to 'keep . . . Arms'⁹ -if the mere exercise of that right were itself enough to trigger federal power?¹⁰ If mere possession sufficed, the Commerce Clause would quietly—but completely—confer the very general police power the Constitution withholds from Congress. To be sure, the Supreme Court has embraced an “expansive interpretation of the commerce power.'¹¹ But even that understanding extends only to 'three general Page 5categories of regulation'¹² -none of which includes '[m]ere possession of a firearm.'¹³ For that reason, I remain open to reconsidering our precedent insulating § 922(g)(1) from enumerated-powers challenges.

I also have doubts about whether Reyes fully accords with the framework we articulated in United States v. Diaz for evaluating as-applied Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1). Under Diaz , we ask whether “at least one of the predicate crimes that [the] § 922(g)(1) conviction relies on . . . was a felony and thus would have led to capital punishment or estate forfeiture' at the Founding.¹⁴ But our later cases have not uniformly followed that approach. Some-including Reyes -have instead applied a more generalized dangerousness inquiry.¹⁵ Perhaps Diaz ’s common-law-analogue test best captures our 'historical tradition of firearm regulation.'¹⁶ Or

not confined to the regulation of commerce among the states.'); Wickard v. Filburn , 317 U.S. 111, 128–29 (1942) (upholding the use of the commerce power to regulate the growing of “wheat consumed on the farm where grown”).

Page 6perhaps a more generalized dangerousness inquiry better captures that tradition.¹⁷ Perhaps neither captures the tradition completely. Or perhaps each captures a distinct strand of it. For now, however, our cases send mixed signals about how district courts should analyze as-applied Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1). In an appropriate case, our full court-or the Supreme Court-should supply the clarity this unsettled corner of Second Amendment law now lacks.