Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama D.C. Docket No. 5:22-cr-00165-LCB-HNJ-1

Before NEWSOM, BRASHER, and ED CARNES, Circuit Judges.

NEWSOM, Circuit Judge:

After pleading guilty to a crime classified by Alabama law as a Class D felony, Joshua Gaines was caught in possession of a firearm. He was charged with and convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)—colloquially, the federal “felon-in-possession” statute.

Page 2Gaines appealed, arguing, as relevant here, that the government had presented insufficient evidence to convict him and, therefore, that the district court erred in refusing to grant his motion for judgment of acquittal. For reasons we will explain, we agree with Gaines that the statute doesn’t cover his conduct. Accordingly, we vacate Gaines’s conviction and remand to the district court with instructions to grant the motion for judgment of acquittal.

I

In November 2019, Joshua Gaines pleaded guilty in an Alabama court to the crime of “receiving stolen property in the third degree.” Gov’t Trial Ex. 2, at 1, Dkt. No. 74-2 (citation modified). Alabama law classifies that offense as a Class D felony. See Ala. Code § 13A-8-18.1(b). Before pleading guilty, Gaines’s lawyer told him (and a state-provided 'Explanation of Rights and Plea of Guilty” form confirmed) that he would receive a “non-prison” sentence of 13 to 31 months, suspended—meaning that it would be deferred provided that he continued to satisfy his terms of probation. See Gov't Trial Ex. 2 at 4; Jury Trial Tr. II, at 260:16-22, Dkt. No. 89.

Gaines’s lawyer was right. Given Gaines’s criminal history, the applicable law foreclosed a sentence that included any actual prison time. Under Alabama law at the time, a Class D felony generally triggered a “definite term of imprisonment” of “not more than 5 years or less than 1 year and 1 day”—but, importantly, it also mandated that any sentence be “in accordance with subsection (b) of Section 15-18-8.” See Ala. Code § 13A-5-6(a)(4) (2019) (amendedPage 3 2023). Section 15-18-8(b), in turn, barred judges from imposing prison sentences on Class D felons who hadn’t been convicted of either (1) three or more felonies or (2) two or more serious felonies. See Ala. Code § 15-18-8(b), (e) (2019) (amended 2023). Instead, for those offenders, it required a sentence of “probation, drug court, or a pretrial diversion program,” or confinement in “a consenting community corrections program” for “a period not exceeding two years'-or, if no community corrections program existed, in a 'high-intensity probation under the supervision of the Board of Pardons and Paroles.' Id.

After pleading guilty, Gaines was given a 24-month suspended sentence and was placed on probation for two years. Following his sentencing, Gaines signed a 'Registration of Felons' form notifying him that, pursuant to the Federal Gun Control Act of 1968, he couldn't possess a firearm.

Six months later, police officers stopped a car in which Gaines was a passenger. The officers discovered a gun in the car, and Gaines admitted that it was his. The officers arrested Gaines and took him to jail.

The government indicted Gaines on two counts: (1) possession of a firearm after having “been convicted in any court of[] a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); and (2) possession of an unregistered firearm, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d).

Page 4At trial, after the government rested, Gaines moved for a judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, contending, as relevant here, that there was insufficient evidence to prove the key fact underlying count one—namely, that he had been convicted of “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The court denied Gaines’s motion but gave him leave to refile at the close of all evidence. He did so, but the district court again denied relief. Although the jury acquitted Gaines on the § 5861(d) count, it convicted him on the § 922(g)(1) count. He was thereafter sentenced to 51 months in prison and three years of supervised release.

Before us, Gaines presents assorted challenges to evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, and sentencing determinations. Because we hold that Gaines is entitled to a judgment of acquittal on the § 922(g)(1) count, we needn't reach any of the remaining issues.¹

When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, “the verdict must stand if the[re] is substantial evidence to support it, that is unless no trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Calderon , 127 F.3d 1314, 1324 (11th Cir. 1997) (citation modified). Here, Gaines’s challenge Page 5to the sufficiency of the evidence turns on the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Section 922(g)(1) is colloquially—indeed, almost ubiquitously-known as the 'felon-in-possession' statute. See, e.g. , United States v. Dubois , 139 F.4th 887, 889 (11th Cir. 2025). As it turns out, though, it doesn’t actually use the word “felon.” If it did, this would be an easier case. After all, Gaines was convicted of a crime that Alabama law expressly classifies as a Class D felony, and he thereafter possessed a firearm.

But alas, § 922(g)(1) doesn’t prohibit felons from possessing firearms. Rather, its terms are more precise: “[I]t shall be unlawful for any person . . . who has been convicted in any court of[] a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . [to] possess in or affecting commerce[] any firearm or ammunition.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The question for us is whether § 922(g)(1), as written, covers Gaines's conduct. We conclude that it does not.²

The case turns on the meaning of one statutory phrase— 'convicted . . . of[] a crime punishable by'-and one term-'imprisonment.” In the discussion that follows, we will explain the proper interpretation of both and then apply § 922(g)(1), so interpreted, to Gaines’s case.

First up, 'convicted . . . of[] a crime punishable by.' 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). That phrase might be understood in either of two different ways. Perhaps, as the government argues, it should be read in an “offense-specific” manner, such that a reviewing court looks to the term of imprisonment generally authorized by the statute underlying the predicate conviction, without regard to the defendant’s particular circumstances. Alternatively, as Gaines contends, it could be read in a “defendant-specific” manner, such that its application turns on the length of the term of imprisonment to which the defendant himself was potentially subject given the circumstances of his case.

On its face, § 922(g)(1)’s would seem to suggest the government’s preferred offense-specific understanding. Most notably, the phrase 'punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” modifies the word “crime”—not some other term in the statute, such as 'person' or 'convicted.'³ So, the argument goes, aPage 7 reviewing court should examine the “punish[ment]” available for the 'crime' of conviction generally, rather than the defendant's particular conduct. Moreover, as we have clarified in another context, “[b]y their very nature, ‘able’ and ‘ible’ words connote a person’s or thing’s character, quality, or status—which, importantly for present purposes, exists independent of any particular facts on the ground.' Barton v. U.S. Att’y Gen. , 904 F.3d 1294, 1299 (11th Cir. 2018). So, one might say, just as in Barton 'an alien [could] be rendered inadmissible regardless of whether he is actually seeking admission,” id. , a crime can be ' punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” regardless of whether the defendant himself is actually subject to imprisonment for such a term, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (emphasis added). Finally, it’s worth noting that before the Supreme Court’s decision in Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder , 560 U.S. 563 (2010)—more on that shortly—a number of our sister circuits had interpreted § 922(g)(1) in an offense-specific manner. See, e.g. , United States v. Jones , 195 F.3d 205, 207 (4th Cir. 1999), abrogated by United States v. Simmons , 649 F.3d 237, 241 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc); United States v. Murillo , 422 F.3d 1152, 1154 (9th Cir. 2005), overruled by United States v. Valencia-Mendoza , 912 F.3d 1215, 1219Page 8 (9th Cir. 2019); United States v. Hill , 539 F.3d 1213, 1219 (10th Cir. 2008), overruled by United States v. Brooks , 751 F.3d 1204, 1209 (10th Cir. 2014); see also United States v. Guzman-Tlaseca , 546 F.3d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 2008) (interpreting the materially identical 21 U.S.C. § 802(44)), overruled by United States v. Haltiwanger , 637 F.3d 881, 883 (8th Cir. 2011).

But—and it’s a big but—whatever the merits of the offensespecific interpretation of § 922(g)(1), we think that analogous Supreme Court precedent forecloses it and requires the defendantspecific reading instead. First, there is Carachuri . There, the Court examined a “maze” of statutory provisions in the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537 . 560 U.S. at 567. The baseline provision allows certain immigrants subject to removal to apply for discretionary relief if, among other things, they haven't been “convicted of any aggravated felony.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3). In relevant part, the term “aggravated felony” is defined as “any felony punishable under . . . the Controlled Substances Act.' 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2). And finally, the term “felony” is defined—again, in relevant part—as “a crime for which the ‘maximum term of imprisonment authorized’ is ‘more than one year.’” Carachuri , 560 U.S. at 567 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)).

Importantly, therefore, the architecture of the interlocking statutes in Carachuri was materially identical to § 922(g)(1)'s. Together, those provisions applied to aliens “convicted” of any “aggravated felony,” defined to mean any “felony punishable” in a certain manner. But the Supreme Court rejected what it called thePage 9 “hypothetical felony approach.” Id. at 580. The Court said that manner of interpreting the provisions—in effect, what we’ve called the offense-specific approach—“ignore[d] the text of the INA.” Id. at 575–76, 580. Rather than focusing on the word “punishable,” as the offense-specific reading would, the Court trained its attention on the word “ convicted ,” saying that it “indicates that we are to look to the conviction itself as our starting place, not to what might have or could have been charged.” Id. at 576. Ultimately, the Court there rejected the government’s appeal to “[t]he mere possibility that the defendant’s conduct, coupled with facts outside of the record of conviction,' could have authorized an aggravated-felony conviction. Id. at 582.

The Supreme Court's follow-on decision in Moncrieffe v. Holder , 569 U.S. 184 (2013), is perhaps even more closely on point. Interpreting the same INA provision at issue in Carachuri , the Court said that § 1229b(a)(3)'s 'upshot' was 'that a noncitizen's conviction of an offense that the Controlled Substances Act [] makes punishable by more than one year's imprisonment will be counted as an 'aggravated felony' for immigration purposes.' Id. at 188 (emphasis added). The similarities between Moncrieffe and this case go beyond statutory architecture. Like Gaines here, Moncrieffe was convicted of an offense that prescribed a default term of imprisonment of more than a year but that was subject to exceptions—in particular, a crime “punishable by five years’ imprisonment ‘ except as provided' in paragraph (4),' which made it 'punishable as a misdemeanor” if it involved “only ‘a small amount of marihuana for no Page 10remuneration.'' Moncrieffe , 569 U.S. at 196 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D), (b)(4)).

Just as it had in Carachuri , the Court in Moncrieffe embraced a defendant-specific interpretation. The Court held that the statute at issue there created two “exclusive” categories—felony and misdemeanor. Id. Importantly for our purposes, it then explained that no “conviction is ‘presumptively’ a felony” and that § 1229b(a)(3) would apply only if “the record of conviction of the predicate offense” had “necessarily establishe[d]” conduct implicating the felony category. Id. at 196–98.

So in both Carachuri and Moncrieffe , the Supreme Court rejected an offense-specific interpretation of § 1229b(a)(3), reasoning that the word “convicted” modifies the term “punishable” in a way that requires the defendant-specific reading. See Carachuri , 560 U.S. at 575–76; Moncrieffe , 569 U.S. at 197-98. Faced with those decisions interpreting a statute with a materially identical structure to § 922(g)(1)’s, we must follow the Supreme Court’s lead and conclude, as well, that the presence of the word “convicted” modifies “punishable” in a way that requires the defendant-specific interpretation of § 922(g)(1).

Tellingly, the very same circuit courts that had embraced the offense-specific reading of § 922(g)(1) and other materially identical statutes before Carachuri reversed course thereafter. The Supreme Court GVR’d Fourth and Eighth Circuit decisions adopting offense-specific interpretations in light of Carachuri , and on remand both courts renounced their earlier positions and embraced the Page 11defendant-specific reading. See Simmons , 649 F.3d at 239 (abrogating Jones ), 241; Haltiwanger , 637 F.3d at 882–83 (overruling GuzmanTlaseca ). The Ninth and Tenth Circuits, both of which had also initially read § 922(g)(1) in an offense-specific manner, soon followed suit, likewise overruling their preCarachuri precedents. See Valencia-Mendoza , 912 F.3d at 1219 (overruling Murillo ); Brooks , 751 F.3d at 1209 (overruling Hill ).⁴

* * *

Accordingly, despite what we take to be strong textual indications that § 922(g)(1) might best be understood in an offense-specific manner—such that it covers any crime for which the law authorizes punishment of more than a year in prison, regardless of any particular defendant's situation-we are constrained by Supreme Court precedent to conclude that the statute must be readPage 12 12 24-10117

in a defendant-specific manner to apply only when the defendant was himself punishable by more than a year’s imprisonment.

Presumably recognizing as much, the government has a backup argument. It contends in the alternative that the term “imprisonment' covers more than just imprison -ment—more, that is, than time in the slammer, and, in particular, that it includes time in a community-corrections program or jailtime that could follow from the hypothetical revocation of a suspended sentence. So understood, the government insists, Gaines himself actually was “punishable”—and indeed punished—“by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (emphasis added). We are not persuaded.

The government initially asserts that we should look to state law to determine what constitutes “imprisonment” for § 922(g)(1) purposes—and that “Alabama courts make clear that a term of imprisonment can be served through community corrections.' Br. of Appellees at 27–29 (collecting cases). With respect, we think the government's major premise is incorrect. Unless Congress “plain[ly] indicat[es]” otherwise—which it hasn’t here—when construing a term in a federal law we use traditional tools of statutory interpretation and look to federal precedent, not to state rules and practices. Taylor v. United States , 495 U.S. 575, 591 (1990) (“[A]bsent plain indication to the contrary, federal laws are not to be construed so that their application is dependent on state law . . . .” (citation modified)).

Page 13In search of the required “plain indication,” the government points to 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20). That statute opens by explaining— for federal-law purposes-that '[t]he term 'crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year’ does not include” either (A) federal or state antitrust, unfair-trade-practice, or similar business-related offenses or (B) state offenses classified as misdemeanors punishable by less than two years in prison. It then says the following, the first sentence of which the government insists requires us to defer to Alabama law’s understanding of “imprisonment”:

What constitutes a conviction of such a crime shall be determined in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were held. Any conviction which has been expunged, or set aside or for which a person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored shall not be considered a conviction for purposes of this chapter, unless such pardon, expungement, or restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the person may not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms.

Id.

We think the government overreads a single sub-subclause of § 921(a)(20). The sentence it quotes says only that “ [w]hat constitutes a conviction of such a crime'-that is, a crime punishable by more than a year in prison-shall be determined in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the predicate proceedings were held. Id. (emphasis added). In Beecham v. United States , 511Page 14 U.S. 368 (1994), the Supreme Court dubbed the sentence that the government emphasizes the “choice-of-law clause” and interpreted it this way: 'Section 922(g) imposes a disability on people who ‘ha[ve] been convicted.’ The choice-of-law clause defines the rule for determining ‘[w]hat constitutes a conviction.’ ' Id. at 371 (emphasis added). We read Beecham as cabining the role of the choice-of-law clause to determining whether a “conviction” exists—and as not extending to the definition of the term “imprisonment.” So, for instance, the choice-of-law clause directs a reviewing court to look to the law of the jurisdiction in which the predicate proceedings were held to determine whether a proper “conviction” resulted— say, from a guilty plea, a nolo contendere plea, etc. Compare, e.g. , United States v. Willis , 106 F.3d 966, 967–70 (11th Cir. 1997) (relying on § 921(a)(20) to hold that, under the governing state law, a nolo plea in which the adjudication has been withheld was not a “conviction” for § 922(g)(1) purposes), with, e.g. , United States v. Anton , 546 F.3d 1355, 1357 (11th Cir. 2008) (relying on § 921(a)(20) to hold that, under the governing state law, a nolo plea following an adjudication of guilt was a 'conviction' for § 922(g)(1) purposes).⁵

Page 15To be sure, there are numerous instances in which a state conviction might bear on the application of a federal law. But that doesn’t mean that we define terms in the federal law by reference to state law. Just the opposite, in fact, and Carachuri is illustrative. There, the Court explained that while a state-law felony can trigger § 1229b(a)(3), “in order to be an ‘aggravated felony’ for immigration law purposes, a state drug conviction must be punishable as a felony under federal law.' 560 U.S. at 569. We think it clear, therefore, that the term 'imprisonment' in § 922(g)(1) must be interpreted in accordance with ordinary rules of statutory interpretation, as informed by federal law.

So, state-law characterizations aside, how, as a matter of federal law, should § 922(g)(1) be understood? We begin with the most fundamental rule of all: “[T]he oldest and most commonsensical interpretive principle' is that '[i]n their full context, words mean what they conveyed to reasonable people at the time they were written . . . .' Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 15-16 (2012). Accordingly, we Page 16ask how the ordinary person would have understood the term “imprisonment” at the time Congress enacted what is now § 922(g)(1) in 1961. See An Act to Strengthen the Federal Firearms Act, Pub. L. No. 87-342, 75 Stat. 757 (1961).

Although not always foolproof guides, dictionaries are a decent place to begin the search for ordinary understanding. And both ordinary-language and legal definitions of the cognate word 'imprison' strongly indicate that 'imprisonment' was (and is) commonly understood to refer to actual confinement in a prison or jail. The contemporaneously published Webster’s Third , for instance, primarily defines 'imprison' to mean 'to put in prison : confine in a jail,' Imprison , Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1137 (1961), and only secondarily as an analogy-'to limit, restrain or confine as if by imprisoning,” id. (providing, as one example, “[ imprison ] ed little sausages in pastry and baked them'). The pertinent edition of Black’s likewise focuses on the formal definition—“[t]o put in a prison; to put in a place of confinement”—and only secondarily on an analogical definition—“[t]o confine a person, or restrain his liberty, in any way.” Imprison , Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1968). And frankly, it seems to us inconceivable that, as used in a statute trained on serious criminal offenses, the term “imprisonment” would be understood by the ordinary American, in 1961 or today, to cover any limitation on one's freedomtellingly, not even the government advances such a sweeping Page 17interpretation. Section 922(g)(1) is thus properly read to employ the usual-and narrower-definition.⁶

The overwhelming weight of persuasive authority in a related context—interpreting the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines—supports that commonsense conclusion. Then-Judge Alito explained more than two decades ago that, as used in U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3, the term “imprisonment” doesn’t cover parole, probation, supervised release, home detention, or other similar non-jail limitations on personal liberty. See United States v. Pray , 373 F.3d 358, 362 (3d Cir. 2004) (collecting cases). Rather, he wrote for the Third Circuit— citing common-language and legal definitions—“[i]n ordinary usage, 'imprisonment' generally means physical confinement.' Id. at 361. Moreover, he emphasized that the common, everyday understanding of the term comported with the clinical meaning: “For example, if a parolee were informed at the end of a parole revocation hearing that the outcome was 'imprisonment,' the parolee would not think that this meant that he was going to be returned to parole.” Id. Judge Alito also noted that with a single outlying exception, “every other court that ha[d] considered the question Page 18ha[d] held that parole, supervised release, and probation do not qualify as ‘imprisonment’ under U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3.” Id. at 362 (citing decisions of the First, Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits); see also United States v. Rosado , 254 F. Supp. 2d 316, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“The Guidelines use the word imprisonment in several sections, and the term appears to consistently mean time spent in jail , as opposed to any form of release.').⁷

In support of its novel and more liberal interpretation of the word “imprisonment,” the government cites 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c). But that statute is pretty far afield of § 922(g)(1) and thus, we think, of only limited relevance. Under it, the Director of the Bureau of Prisons is directed to ensure that a prisoner “spends a portion of the final months” of “a term of imprisonment” under “conditions that will afford [him] a reasonable opportunity to adjust to and prepare for the reentry of that prisoner into the community”—such as in a 'community correctional facility.' 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(1). The government's reliance on § 3624, though, boomerangs back around on itself. True, that statute provides that the waning days of a “term of imprisonment” may be spent outside the four walls of prison, but in so doing it confirms that, except in that narrow window, “imprisonment” means exactly what the dictionaries attest and common usage confirms: in prison . See also, e.g. , 18 U.S.C.

Page 19§ 3621(b) (describing the “place of the prisoner’s imprisonment” as being somewhere with “bed[s]” and as being subject to the “minimum standards of . . . habitability”). So § 3624 doesn’t get the government very far—and certainly provides no warrant for ignoring the ordinary understanding of the term 'imprisonment.'⁸

For these reasons, we hold that, as used in § 922(g)(1), the term “imprisonment” means confinement in a prison or jail, not participation in some non-carceral community-corrections program or the like.

Having done the hard work of interpreting § 922(g)(1), applying it to Gaines’s case is relatively straightforward. To recap, § 922(g)(1) reads as follows: '[I]t shall be unlawful for any person . . . who has been convicted in any court of[] a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . [to] possess in or affecting commerce[] any firearm or ammunition.” We have concluded that, under Carachuri and Moncrieffe , we are obliged to read § 922(g)(1) in a defendant-specific manner, such that its application depends on the length of the term of imprisonment to which a particular criminal defendant was potentially subject given the Page 20facts and circumstances of his case. And we have concluded that, as used in § 922(g)(1), the term 'imprisonment' refers to actual confinement in a prison, jail, or comparable facility. The question, therefore, is whether, given the circumstances of his case, Gaines himself was actually subject to a sentence requiring him to spend at least a year in such a facility.

He was not. For reasons already explained, given Gaines’s criminal history, Alabama law foreclosed the possibility that he would serve any time in prison for his Class D felony. See supra at 2–3. To be sure, Gaines was subject to other punishments: probation, drug court, pretrial diversion, and time in a “community corrections program.' Ala. Code § 15-18-8(b), (e) (2019) (amended 2023). But none of those, as implemented in Alabama, is tantamount to jail-like “imprisonment.”

The only one of the sanctions that Gaines faced that requires any explanation is “community corrections.” In multiple places and ways, though, Alabama law makes clear that a communitycorrections program isn’t comparable to prison. As an initial matter, the 2019 statute under which Gaines was sentenced expressly distinguishes community-corrections programs from “prisons” and 'jail-type institution[s].' Id. § 15-18-8(b). It states that unless a judge sentences a Class C or Class D felon to probation, drug court, or a pretrial-diversion program, he “shall order that the convicted defendant be confined in a prison, jail-type institution, treatment institution, or community corrections program for a Class C felony offense or in a consenting community corrections program for a Page 21Class D felony offense.' Id. Two aspects of that statute are instructive. First, even with respect to Class C felons, it describes a “community-corrections program” as an alternative to—not the equivalent of—“a prison [or] jail-type institution.” Id. Second, and relatedly, the statute makes clear that while a Class C felon can be confined in a prison or jail, a Class D felon like Gaines cannot be; rather, a Class D felon can be sentenced only to probation, drug court, pretrial diversion, or 'confine[ment] . . . in a consenting community-corrections program.' Id. By its terms, therefore, the statute forecloses the possibility that a defendant in Gaines’s shoes can be confined in an actual prison or jail.

Separately, in multiple respects, the Alabama Community Punishment and Corrections Act, see Ala. Code § 15-18-170 et seq. , makes clear that a community-corrections sentence isn't tantamount to imprisonment. First, and most conspicuously, the Act expressly defines the term “[c]ommunity punishment and corrections program” as “an alternative to incarceration.” Ala. Code § 1518-171(6). The “alternative to incarceration” language was added to the statute in 2003, and contemporaneous dictionaries (unsurprisingly) define the term “incarceration” and its cognates as synonyms of “imprisonment” and its cognates. See, e.g. , Incarceration, Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999) (“[T]he act or process of confining someone; IMPRISONMENT.”); Incarcerate , Merriam-Webster's Dictionary of Law (1996) (“IMPRISON.”); Incarcerate , American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (4th ed. 2001) (“1. To imprison; 2. To confine.”). So like the statute under which Gaines was sentenced, the Act indicates that a community- Page 22corrections sentence is an alternative to— i.e. , different from—traditional imprisonment. Accord, e.g. , id. § 15-18-175(d)(1) (describing community corrections as an “alternative to prison”).

Second, and similarly, the Act identifies one of its “goals” as being to “reduce the number of offenders committed to correctional institutions and jails by punishing such offenders in alternative punishment settings.' Id. § 15-18-173(3). So again, the Act identifies community corrections as an “alternative” to incarcerating offenders in “correctional institutions and jails.”

Third, the Act expressly catalogues the types of facilities and services that might constitute '[c]ommunity-based programs.' Id. § 15-18-180(b). None of those listed bears any meaningful resemblance to prison. For instance: (1) “[c]ommunity service supervision; victim restitution, community detention and restitution centers; day reporting centers; victim-offender reconciliation programs; home confinement/curfew; electronic surveillance; intensive supervision probation; alcohol/drug outpatient treatment and psychiatric counseling'; (2) '[s]hort-term community residential treatment options that involve close supervision in a residential setting,' including '[d]etoxification centers; community detention centers for special needs offenders and probation and parole violators; and inpatient drug/alcohol treatment'; (3) '[r]esidential inhouse drug and alcohol treatment for detoxification and residential and nonresidential drug and alcohol counseling'; and even (4) '[c]hurches or other nonprofit facilities that provide religious- Page 23based counseling, education, or other rehabilitative services.” Id. § 15-18-180(b)(1)–(3), (5).

Finally, the Act specifies the circumstances under which a community-corrections sentence may be altered or revoked—and, in so doing, clearly distinguishes between community-corrections programs and actual imprisonment. For instance, the Act provides that if the offender violates a condition of his community-corrections sentence, the court may (among other options) “[m]odify the conditions of serving the sentence, possibly including the inclusion of short periods of confinement in local facilities . . . .” Id. § 15-18175(d)(3)(a)(4). The Act then goes on to state that “[t]he court shall not revoke” a community-corrections sentence “and order the confinement to prison of the offender” unless the court finds that “[n]o measure short of confinement” will adequately protect the community and address the seriousness of the offender’s violation. Id. § 15-18-175(d)(3)(d). Both provisions make clear that a community-corrections sentence does not itself entail 'confinement' in “prison”—which, to the contrary, results only from both (1) a violation and (2) a judicial finding of necessity.

Bottom line: Alabama law, both as written and as interpreted and implemented, makes clear that a “community corrections program” of the sort referred to in the statute under which Page 24Gaines was sentenced does not constitute “imprisonment” as that term is used in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).⁹

* * *

Because Gaines couldn’t receive any real-deal jail time for his Class D felony, that offense doesn’t qualify as a “crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” within the meaning of § 922(g)(1).¹⁰

Page 25The Class D state-law felony for which Gaines was convicted is not a “crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.' 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Accordingly, the evidence at trial was insufficient to sustain a conviction for that offense. We therefore VACATE the district court's order denying Gaines’s motion for judgment of acquittal and REMAND with instructions for it to enter the judgment in his favor.