Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division. No. 1:23-cv-01454-RLY-MJD — Richard L. Young , Judge .

ARGUED MAY 12, 2026 — DECIDED AUGUST 24, 2026

Before EASTERBROOK, MALDONADO, and TAIBLESON, Circuit Judges .

MALDONADO, Circuit Judge . After Richard Highbaugh's employer, Exelead, Inc., declined to interview him for a promotion and gave the role to an external candidate, Highbaugh sued. Highbaugh, who is black and was 60 years old at the time, believes he was not selected because of his race and age (the selected hire was white and in his thirties). The district court granted summary judgment to Exelead, concluding that Page 2Highbaugh failed to show that the company's justification for its decision-concern about Highbaugh's qualifications-was pretextual. We agree and affirm.

Highbaugh has worked for Exelead, a clinical drug manufacturer and distributor, for upwards of 28 years in various warehouse positions. At some point during his first 10 years with the company, Highbaugh, then working as a Material Technician, began performing “sampling” duties. Sampling involved taking samples of raw materials that arrived at the warehouse and delivering them to a lab for testing to ensure suitability for drug manufacturing. Highbaugh was promoted around 2008 to a team lead position, to a supervisory role around 2013, and to the role of Senior Supervisor around 2017.

In August 2019, Highbaugh received a verbal warning for 'substandard work and carelessness.' Highbaugh believed that this warning was in retaliation for a complaint he lodged the month prior about his workload. In the aftermath of the warning, Highbaugh explained to his manager that he could not maintain both the sampling duties and his supervisory duties. So Exelead soon reorganized the department and created a Sampling Specialist role for Highbaugh, continuing to give him the same pay he was receiving as a Senior Supervisor. Meanwhile, Highbaugh also submitted a charge to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), alleging that he was experiencing race and age discrimination and retaliation because of the complaint he had made about his workload.

Page 3Highbaugh's performance reviews varied. In 2020 and 2021, they were “lower than he expected”—he believed the negative feedback was in retaliation for his EEOC complaint. But his performance review in 2022 was generally positive. He was rated as above average in job knowledge and work quality; excellent in dependability; and satisfactory in attitude, communication, and work output. For those categories rated as satisfactory, written feedback indicated that Highbaugh’s emails were sometimes difficult to follow, he could be more “effective[] and efficient[]” with his communication, there was room to increase his productivity and time management, and he could take initiative to learn new skills.

Highbaugh's supervisor, Aaron Mendez, testified that though Highbaugh performed his job as a Sampling Specialist well, Mendez had concerns about Highbaugh’s skills and professionalism. For example, Mendez explained that Highbaugh's capabilities with Microsoft Excel and Word were “amateur or introductory at best,” which was concerning because Highbaugh had to prepare spreadsheets tracking his sampling; that Mendez had witnessed multiple occasions of Highbaugh “practically yelling” in front of his peers at team meetings while 'air[ing] his frustrations'; that he received several poorly written emails from Highbaugh; that Highbaugh needed support with scheduling and time management; and that Highbaugh “would constantly miss [] deadlines.” Based on these observations, Mendez believed Highbaugh 'did not have excellent organizational, leadership, presentation, interpersonal, and written communication skills.”

Highbaugh disagrees with Mendez's assessment of his skills and his behavior. He swore that Mendez 'barely Page 4observed” his work and had “never helped” him with things like scheduling or operating Microsoft Excel. Highbaugh opined that he has “great interpersonal and communication skills' and is 'proficient' with Microsoft programs. Highbaugh also submitted affidavits from co-workers, who offered positive views about his skills.

In 2022, a vacancy became available for a Materials Manager position, the role to which Highbaugh reported as a Sampling Specialist. Mendez was responsible for conducting interviews and filling that vacancy.

The job posting was opened internally at Exelead from July 14 to July 21, 2022, though Highbaugh did not apply during that window. The posting instructed interested employees to submit the application form and a resume to Human Resources. Requirements listed in the job posting included 10 or more years of warehouse experience in the pharmaceutical industry; 5 or more years of department management experience; 4 or more years of experience with particular software; proficiency with Microsoft programs; excellent organizational, leadership, and communication skills; and strong analytical and critical thinking skills. After the internal posting had been open for a week, it was posted externally.

About two months after the internal posting closed, Highbaugh approached Mendez on the warehouse floor and handed him his resume and an internal transfer form. According to Highbaugh, the interaction was brief, and Mendez thanked him. Mendez, for his part, says he thanked Highbaugh for his interest, “advised him that he was not the candidate that [he] was looking for for the role,” and explained Page 5that he was looking for someone with exposure to larger scale manufacturing and demonstrated leadership with a team. But, Mendez says, he also expressed to Highbaugh that he was interested in putting Highbaugh “in more of a supervisor type role with potential for more responsibilities in leadership.' As Mendez tells it, Highbaugh seemed interested in that alternative role and told Mendez that he was applying for the Materials Manager role just in case Mendez could not find anyone else to fill it.

The next day, Highbaugh emailed Mendez asking (among a few other unrelated topics) “what is available to me between the senior supervisor and the manager’s position.” Though the email indicates he was inquiring about Mendez's proposed alternative role, Highbaugh insists that he was really inquiring about the status of his application for the Manager role. Mendez did not reply. A few days later, Highbaugh emailed a Human Resources employee to ask if he had received Highbaugh’s application and resume for the Manager role; the employee had not.

In late October 2022, Mendez hired an external candidate named Brandon Miller—a white man in his thirties—for the Materials Manager position. Although Miller was lacking some of the qualifications listed on the job posting (most notably, he did not have 10 years of warehouse experience in pharmaceuticals and fell short of 5 years of management experience), Mendez interviewed Miller because he had recently worked in another highly regulated industry and had managed teams of up to 20 people across multiple shifts and buildings. Mendez reports that in interviews, Miller appeared passionate about the role, showed problem solving skills, and provided detailed responses to questions and hypotheticals Page 6posed to him. Mendez decided Miller was the best candidate for the job and extended an offer, which Miller accepted.

In early November 2022, shortly before learning about the selection of Miller for the role, Highbaugh called Mendez to ask about the status of his application. The next day, Highbaugh and Mendez met, and Mendez offered Highbaugh a supervisor role, as the two had previously discussed. Mendez thought this role would give Highbaugh more experience so he’d be better positioned for a manager role the next time one opened. Highbaugh declined the offer, and asked Mendez why he hadn’t been interviewed for the Materials Manager position. Mendez responded that he “needed someone who was able to manage multiple buildings.' Highbaugh has never held a “manager” position at Exelead, though he did hold a “supervisor” title from roughly 2013 to 2019 (the details of which are not fleshed out in the record).

Mendez admits that Highbaugh satisfied many of the requirements for the Materials Manager position (and some of Highbaugh’s peers thought he was a natural fit for the role), but as elaborated above, Mendez says he had concerns about Highbaugh’s skills in a variety of areas. Mendez also did not believe Highbaugh was seriously interested in the role based on how late he applied (two months after the posting) and the informal way in which he applied (in passing in the warehouse).

Highbaugh filed a charge with the EEOC in February 2023, alleging that the choice to hire Miller instead of promoting him was discriminatory. Exelead filed a position statement, explaining that Highbaugh lacked qualifications that Page 7Mendez wanted the manager to possess, had not appeared genuinely interested in the role, and struggled with communication skills.

After receiving the EEOC’s dismissal and right-to-sue notice, Highbaugh brought this suit pro se. He later obtained counsel, who filed an amended complaint asserting race discrimination claims under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, an age discrimination claim under 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq. (the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”)), and a retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.¹

The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Exelead on all claims. With respect to the discrimination claims, the court reasoned that Highbaugh failed to show that Mendez’s stated reasons for declining to promote him were pretextual.

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Highbaugh, the non-moving party, and giving him 'the benefit of all reasonable inferences in [his] favor.” Paterakos v. City of Chicago , 147 F.4th 787, 795 (7th Cir. 2025). “Summary judgment is proper if ‘there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a)). The ultimate question is whether Highbaugh has shown “that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in [his] favor.' Id. (quoting Benuzzi v. Bd. of Educ. , 647 F.3d 652, 662 (7th Cir. 2011)). For purposes Page 8of this appeal, Highbaugh’s discrimination claims can be evaluated together because the inquiries are similar. See Gamble v. Cnty. of Cook , 106 F.4th 622, 625 (7th Cir. 2024) (addressing Title VII and § 1981 claims together); Vassileva v. City of Chicago , 118 F.4th 869, 873 (7th Cir. 2024) (same with Title VII and ADEA claims).

The parties have approached this case through the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.² Under that framework, Highbaugh must first establish a prima facie case for discrimination by presenting evidence that he was a member of a protected class, qualified for the position but rejected, and the position was given to a person outside the protected class who was similarly or less qualified than him. Cunningham v. Austin , 125 F.4th 783, 788 (7th Cir. 2025) (citing Logan v. City of Chicago , 4 F.4th 529, 536 (7th Cir. 2021)). If those elements are established, “the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.' Id. (quoting Lewis v. Ind. Wesleyan Univ. , 36 F.4th 755, 760 (7th Cir. 2022)). Then “the burden ‘shifts back to the employee to show why the employer's explanation is pretextual.’” Id. (quoting Lewis , 36 F.4th at 760).

Here, even assuming Highbaugh made out a prima facie case for discrimination, his claims fail because Exelead Page 9articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for declining to promote him, and he has not met his burden to show that the explanation is pretextual. See Vassileva , 118 F.4th at 874 (citation omitted) (courts may “skip the analysis” of the prima facie case). According to Exelead, Miller was interviewed and hired for the position Highbaugh sought because Mendez believed Miller possessed the more relevant managerial experience and skill set. This is a legitimate proffered nondiscriminatory reason for passing over Highbaugh. See Scruggs v. Garst Seed Co. , 587 F.3d 832, 838 (7th Cir. 2009) (hiring someone whom employer believed to be better qualified is non-discriminatory reason for action); Riley v. Elkhart Cmty. Schs. , 829 F.3d 886, 893 (7th Cir. 2016) (same).

But Highbaugh says this stated rationale is a lie-it's merely a pretext covering the real, discriminatory basis for the decision. 'An otherwise legitimate, non-discriminatory hiring rationale is pretextual if the hiring manager did not ‘sincerely believe[]' the rationale when making his final decision.” Cunningham , 125 F.4th at 789 (quoting Little v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue , 369 F.3d 1007, 1015 (7th Cir. 2004)). If an employer “honestly believed” it selected the best candidate, “its reasoning is not pretext, 'even if its decision was inaccurate, unfair, … foolish, trivial, or baseless.'' Id. at 790 (quoting BarnesStaples v. Carnahan , 88 F.4th 712, 716 (7th Cir. 2023)). So, this appeal turns on whether Highbaugh's evidence-be it circumstantial or the rare smoking gun—could lead a reasonable jury to conclude that Mendez did not genuinely believe Miller was the better candidate. See Paterakos , 147 F.4th at 795.

Highbaugh advances two theories of pretext: (1) Mendez and Exelead have offered shifting and inconsistent explanations for the hiring decision, and (2) Highbaugh was so clearly Page 10better qualified for the position than Miller, that Mendez could not honestly have believed Miller to be the better candidate. But the evidence that Highbaugh offers for each theory does not surmount the reasonable jury standard we employ here.

First, Highbaugh argues that a jury could find pretext because Mendez and Exelead have had inconsistent explanations for the decision not to promote him. It is true that “[s]hifting and inconsistent explanations can provide a basis for a finding of pretext.” Schuster v. Lucent Techs., Inc. , 327 F.3d 569, 577 (7th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). But “the explanations must actually be shifting and inconsistent to permit an inference of mendacity.' Id . (citation omitted). Where the “overall account is substantially consistent,” this standard is not met. Id. at 577-78. Nor is it enough that there is some elaboration on a decision over time. See Saud v. DePaul Univ. , 154 F.4th 563, 569 (7th Cir. 2025) (“Merely providing multiple, or additional, reasons for an adverse employment decision does not establish pretext.'); Johnson v. Nordstrom, Inc. , 260 F.3d 727, 733–34 (7th Cir. 2001) (an employer supplementing reasons for adverse action is not evidence of pretext when the reasons do not conflict, and the employer does not retract a reason). Similarly, an employer’s “failure to address all of the reasons in each communication about the employee is not enough … .” Castro v. DeVry Univ., Inc. , 786 F.3d 559, 577 (7th Cir. 2015) (no pretext where employer’s “decision to emphasize [one] rationale in her email to [plaintiff] did not create an inconsistency. She did not disavow or contradict the [other] justification; she simply failed to mention it.”).

Here, regardless of the lingering dispute about what Mendez told Highbaugh when Highbaugh applied for the Page 11Materials Manager position on the warehouse floor, it is undisputed that Mendez told Highbaugh in November that he wanted someone with a different type of experience (i.e., someone who could “manage multiple buildings”). That reason, the need for larger-scale management experience, has been articulated consistently: first in Exelead’s position statement to the EEOC, then in the company’s interrogatory responses in this case, and then in Mendez’s deposition. What was added to the explanation after November was Mendez’s concern about Highbaugh’s communication skills and his belief that Highbaugh wasn’t sincerely interested in the position because of his late application. These added justifications are neither shifting nor inconsistent. They align with Mendez’s contemporaneous explanation and appear merely to supplement or add color to that reasoning. See Johnson , 260 F.3d at 733 ('[C]onflicting, and at times retracted, justifications for adverse treatment” are evidence of pretext, but mere supplementation of explanation, when consistent, is not.).

Second, Highbaugh argues that a jury could find pretext because he was so much more qualified than Miller that Mendez could not have honestly believed Miller was the better candidate. “But we have set a high evidentiary bar for pretext,” and evidence of Highbaugh’s qualifications could surpass that bar only “if the differences between [him and Miller] were so favorable to [Highbaugh] that there can be no dispute among reasonable persons of impartial judgment that [Highbaugh] was clearly better qualified for the position.' Riley , 829 F.3d at 894 (citation omitted).

No one is contesting that Highbaugh, who has devoted decades of his professional life to Exelead, possessed some of the qualifications necessary for the Materials Manager role.

Page 12But so did Miller. A comparison of the two does not objectively reveal that Highbaugh was clearly better qualified for the position. Highbaugh may have had more years under his belt, some of which was spent in a supervisory role, but Miller had the specific type of large-scale management experience Mendez said he was looking for. And Highbaugh was not involved in interviewing Miller, so he cannot speak to what else was revealed about Miller’s background or skillset beyond his resume that might have affected Mendez’s decision. All Highbaugh can say is that, in his own opinion, 3 he was more qualified than Miller. But “[a]n employee’s ‘own opinions about [his] qualifications do not give rise to a material factual dispute.'' Robertson v. Wis. Dep’t of Health Servs. , 949 F.3d 371, 381 (7th Cir. 2020) (citation modified).

Highbaugh also has not put forward any circumstantial evidence suggesting that Mendez did not sincerely believe Miller was more qualified. Highbaugh did not need to produce smoking-gun evidence catching Mendez in a lie. Rather, “[c]ircumstantial evidence of falsity—including the fact that a stated reason is just improbable or unreasonable—can support a reasonable inference of pretext.' Wilson v. AIM Specialty Health , 176 F.4th 977, 984 (7th Cir. 2026) (collecting cases). The Page 13question is whether “a jury could find [an employer’s stated reasons] unworthy of belief.” Id. Here, there is nothing inherently suspect or nonsensical about Mendez's justification. Evaluated in the context of prior similar criticism of Highbaugh and Mendez offering Highbaugh an alternative supervisory role to gain relevant experience, the explanation is not 'fishy enough to support an inference that the real reason must be discriminatory.” See Loudermilk v. Best Pallet Co., LLC , 636 F.3d 312, 315 (7th Cir. 2011) . And we have no evidence, for example, of prior comments from Mendez about race or age or comments that contradicted his stated views on Highbaugh’s qualifications that might render the explanation “unworthy of belief.” See Wilson , 176 F.4th at 984 .

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.