Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin. No. 23-cv-00693-jdp — James D. Peterson, Chief Judge .

ARGUED OCTOBER 27, 2025 — DECIDED AUGUST 28, 2026

Before EASTERBROOK, ROVNER, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges .

ROVNER, Circuit Judge . While at the Dane County Jail on a probation hold, Randy Talley was assaulted by another inmate. He filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that deputy officer Carl Gloede and the Dane County Jail were liable for failing to protect him. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, and on appeal Talley challenges only summary judgment as to Gloede.

Page 2We begin with the undisputed facts as set forth by the district court, which the parties on appeal do not challenge. The assault that forms the basis for this § 1983 action occurred at the Dane County jail, where Talley was incarcerated on a probation hold. Talley was housed in Cellblock 607, which consisted of eight private cells and a shared dayroom. The incident occurred on the morning of October 18, 2020, and Jerome Wheeler, the inmate who assaulted Talley, had first moved into Cellblock 607 only a few hours earlier. There was no history of conflict, or even contact, between Talley and Wheeler prior to that morning.

On that morning, Talley was sitting in the dayroom looking at a tablet used by inmates, and Wheeler entered and accused Talley of stealing money from his tablet account. Wheeler and Talley began arguing, although Talley does not remember what was said. At one point, Wheeler took a swing at Talley but did not make contact with him. Wheeler and Talley eventually walked away from each other in the dayroom, each moving to opposite sides of a large table, but continued to engage with one another. After arguing for a few minutes, Talley walked to the window that looked into the hallway and called for an officer. Officer Carl Gloede, one of two deputies on duty in Cellblock 607 that morning, responded and found Talley at the window and Wheeler standing between the inner and outer doors. Both were trying to speak to him at the same time, with Wheeler accusing Talley of theft and Talley stating that Wheeler was crazy and had taken a swing at him. Talley acknowledges that he was not arguing in that moment, but simply explaining himself. He further states that Gloede went to the window to speak to him and then to the other window to speak with Wheeler, and described the interactions as all of them just talking. Gloede decided to have both Page 3Talley and Wheeler lock themselves down in their individual cells until after breakfast, when he would have more time to investigate their complaints. He ordered them to return to their cells and lock the cell doors, and Talley proceeded to his cell with Wheeler following behind him. Talley entered his cell first and Gloede then saw Wheeler jump back from Talley's cell entrance and assume a fighting posture, and then lunge into Talley’s cell, attacking Talley. Gloede immediately called for backup and waited for it to arrive before proceeding into Talley's cell to assist him. Within about 44 seconds, backup had arrived and deputies had entered the cellblock and separated Talley and Wheeler. Talley suffered serious injuries to his face and eye as a result of the assault.

Talley argues that Gloede violated his constitutional rights by failing to protect him from Wheeler’s assault. The parties recognize that it remains unsettled in our circuit whether failure-to-protect claims brought by inmates on a probation hold are governed by the Eighth or the Fourteenth Amendment, and agreed to apply the Fourteenth Amendment standard applicable to pretrial detainees. See Christensen v. Weiss , 145 F.4th 743, 751 (7th Cir. 2025). Even under the less onerous Fourteenth Amendment standard addressed by the parties, the district court's grant of summary judgment against Talley was proper.

In order to demonstrate a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment for failure to protect, Talley must demonstrate that: (1) Gloede made an intentional decision regarding the conditions of Talley's confinement; (2) those conditions placed Talley at a substantial risk of serious harm; (3) Gloede did not take reasonable available measures to abate the risk, even though a reasonable officer in those circumstances Page 4would have appreciated the high degree of risk involved, making the consequences of Gloede’s inaction obvious; and (4) Gloede’s conduct caused Talley’s injuries. Thomas v. Dart , 39 F.4th 835, 841 (7th Cir. 2022); Kemp v. Fulton Cty ., 27 F.4th 491, 496 (7th Cir. 2022).

The third element requires an allegation that a specific defendant “was on notice of a serious risk of harm” to the detainee. Kemp, 27 F.4th at 497. Put another way, it must be plausibly alleged that a reasonable officer in a defendant's circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk the detainee was facing. Id .

Thomas , 39 F.4th at 841.

The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the intentional decision instructing Talley and Wheeler to return to their cells placed Talley at a substantial risk of serious harm, and specifically whether a reasonable officer in those circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk involved, making the consequences of Gloede’s decision obvious. The facts on summary judgment here do not support liability under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Gloede was faced with a situation involving a loud disagreement between two inmates. The only evidence that the disagreement would turn physical was the statement to Gloede by Talley that Wheeler had taken a swing at him. Arguments between inmates in a prison environment are not uncommon, and the only indication here conveyed to Gloede that the argument could escalate beyond a verbal confrontation was that lone early attempt by Wheeler to take a swing at Talley. The circumstances presented here would not have Page 5alerted a reasonable officer that allowing Wheeler and Talley to walk back to their cells would present a high degree of risk to Talley of serious harm because there was sparse evidence of a threat of any imminent physical altercation. There was no evidence before Gloede that Wheeler followed up that missed swing with any further attempt to make physical contact with Talley, and the two men proceeded to present their side of the story to Gloede with neither one attempting to turn the dispute physical. To establish a Fourteenth Amendment violation for failure to protect, it is not enough to show there was some risk of harm; a constitutional violation is established only by demonstrating a high degree of risk of serious harm. At the time of the order to return to the cell, Gloede had minimal evidence that the dispute, at the point in which Gloede was involved, could turn physical, and certainly no evidence that the inmates were on the verge of a physical altercation or that the situation otherwise presented a “substantial risk” of serious harm to Talley. Although Wheeler had unimpeded physical access to Talley the entire time they were out of their cells, including when the two were speaking with Gloede through the window, Wheeler did not physically attack Talley beyond that initial truncated attempt. Here, the only evidence Talley had presented as to Gloede’s awareness of a risk was that the two were engaged in a verbal dispute which they brought to Gloede, and that Talley informed Gloede that Wheeler had taken a swing at him earlier that did not land. A reasonable officer presented with those circumstances would not perceive a high degree of risk of serious harm if the two were instructed to isolate in their own cells until their complaints could be further investigated.

Nor would the actions of the inmates when Gloede ordered them to their cell have alerted a reasonable officer to Page 6such a risk of harm. When instructed to return to their cells and lock the cell doors, Talley proceeded to his cell with Wheeler following him. There is no evidence that Talley requested that Wheeler proceed in front of him, nor is there evidence that he expressed misgivings about them walking to their cells together or that he feared any danger from Wheeler at that time. Nothing in Talley’s response to the order to head to their cells, therefore, would have alerted a reasonable officer to any potential risk of harm, or would indicate that Talley himself perceived such a risk. The circumstances as known to Gloede would not cause a reasonable person to know that there was a substantial risk of serious harm in allowing them to walk to their cells and shut their doors.

The first time that a reasonable officer in Gloede’s situation would have appreciated a high degree of risk of harm to Talley was when Wheeler assumed a fighting stance and lunged at Talley in his cell. Gloede responded immediately to that threat by calling for backup, and within 44 seconds Talley and that backup officer were in Talley’s cell terminating the assault. Talley does not contend that Gloede’s response at that time was not objectively reasonable.

Because we agree with the district court’s decision on the merits, we need not address Gloede's alternative claim of qualified immunity. The district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Gloede, and the decision of the district court is AFFIRMED.