Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 4:22-CV-930

Before DENNIS, OLDHAM, and DoUGLAs, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Plaintiff-Appellant Juanita Ramirez brought an excessive-force claim against Lake Worth Police Department ("LWPD"） Officer Jonathan Granado after he shot and killed her son, Estevan Ramirez, as he fled from Page 2pursuing officers. The district court granted summary judgment to Officer Granado, concluding his use of deadly force was reasonable and, as a result, that qualified immunity shielded his actions from suit and liability. For the reasons that follow, we REVERSE and REMAND for further proceedings.

On September 3, 2021, at approximately 2:06 AM, Officer Granado, on duty in his marked police vehicle, heard fellow L WPD Officer R. Watson report over the police radio that he was engaged in a high-speed pursuit of a white Volkswagen Jetta whose driver failed to yield to a traffic stop for speeding. Officer Granado responded by joining the pursuit as a backup unit. At Officer Watson's request, LWPD dispatch ran the suspect vehicle's license plate and informed both officers that the fleeing vehicle was “not stolen" but that it previously evaded pursuit by a different police agency and s r, however, and contrary to Officer Granado's later assertions, the transcripts of the dispatch and radio communications contain no indication that either officer received information suggesting that the vehicle or its occupants were involved in any “ drive-by shootings."1

At 2:18 AM, Officer Granado located the ongoing pursuit and began following Officer Watson as the secondary chase unit. A few minutes later, the suspect vehicle made a sharp turn, struck a curb, and sustained significant damage. The suspect vehicle continued on for a short distance before coming to a stop at 2:22 AM. Officer Watson stopped his patrol car near the disabled vehicle. When the suspect vehicle came to a stop, four unidentified Page 3individuals (including Ramirez) exited and fled in different directions. Officer Watson, who had also exited his patrol car, observed Ramirez Ramirez emerged from the vehicle, he held a handgun in his left hand and a cell phone in his right, though it is disputed when law enforcement learned briefly paused to retrieve it. Officer Watson saw Ramirez “trying to flee" but " did not see a gun" at that point.

The following events unfolded over the span of approximately eight , , s s! time, saw that Ramirez was holding a handgun “in a downward motion." Upon observing the handgun, Officer Watson “pushed off of" or “"back[ed] away" from Ramirez to create distance as he attempted to unholster his own weapon. At the same time, Officer Granado stopped his patrol car to the right of Officer Watson's, exited it while drawing his service weapon, and shouted "he's got a gun, he's got a gun!" Officer Granado fired a single shot in the direction of Officer Watson and Ramirez—a shot that Officer Watson later Watson “in a southwest direction" and “continued to flee away from him across the street'" and into a nearby intersection.

The officers’ accounts diverge as to what happened next. Officer Granado later claimed that Ramirez “was swinging his pistol in the direction that “Ramirez never pointed the gun toward me or while he was running away[.]" As Ramirez continued to flee from the officers, Officer Granado fired his service weapon at Ramirez six more times without warning. Four of his bullets struck the back of Ramirez's head and shoulders.Ramirez collapsed face-first on the street in the direction he had been running. Officer Page 4Watson, who had attempted to unholster his weapon, never “cleared leather" before the gunfire ended. Seconds later, Officer Granado asked Plaintiff-Appellant Juanita Ramirez, individually and on behalf of Estevan Ramirez's estate, brought an excessive-force claim against Officer Granado under 42 U.S.C. S 1983. Officer Granado moved for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The district court granted Officer Granado's motion, concluding his use of deadly force was objectively reasonable under the circumstances and, as a result, he was entitled to qualified immunity. The district court entered final judgment dismissing Plaintiff-Appellant's suit with prejudice. This timely appeal followed.

We review a district court's grant of summary judgment based on qualified immunity de novo. Crane v. City of Arlington, Tex., 50 F.4th 453, 461 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing Aguirre v. City of San Antonio, 995 F.3d 395, 405 sng s e , ( ) on the basis of qualified immunity, ^‘the burden then shifts to the plaintiff who must rebut the defense by establishing a genuine fact issue as to whether the official's allgedly wrongful conduct violated clearly established law. '" n pm s si , ( p 5a ) most favorable to the nonmovant and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in his favor." Id. (citing Darden v. City of Fort Worth, 880 F.3d 722, 727 (5th Cir. 2018)).

We conclude Plaintiff-Appellant has established genuine disputes of material fact that preclude the grant of summary judgment on qualified immunity.

Whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity involves two inquiries: (1) “whether the officer's conduct violated a federal right," and (2) “whether that right was clearly established at the time of the violation." Id. at 463 (citing Tolan, 572 U.S. at 655-56). “Under the first step, to state a violation of the Fourth Amendment prohibition on excessive force,’" the plaintiff must show: “(1) an injury that (2) resulted directly and only from the use of force that was excessive to the need, and (3) the use of force that was objectively unreasonable." Bush v. Strain, 513 F.3d 492, 500-01 (5th Cir. 2008).

"[T]he ‘reasonableness' inquiry .. . is an objective one," Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989), and “requires analyzing the ^totality of the circumstances.'" Barnes v. Felix, 145 S. Ct. 1353, 1358 (2025) (quoting Cnty. of Los Angeles v. Mende%, 581 U.S. 420, 427-28 (2017)). While objective reasonableness is “not capable of a precise definition or mechanical application," the Supreme Court in Graham v. Connor outlined a few considerations that inform the need for force: (1) the severity of the crime at issue, (2) whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety of officers or others, and (3) whether the suspect was actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight. 490 U.S. at 396 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979)).

analysis when deadly force has been deployed[.]"' See Crane, 50 F.4th at 463.2Page 6 Officer Granado asserts that, when he stopped his police cruiser, he “saw that [Ramirez] had a pistol in his hand, ” and “believed [Ramirez] was going to shoot and kill Officer Watson and [him].”" It is undisputed Officer Granado observed Ramirez move toward Officer Watson, who briefly made physical contact with Ramirez in what Officer Watson later described as a fleeting altercation. But this speaks to the first unsuccessful shot Officer Granado fired in the direction of Ramirez. Officer Granado admits that, after this first ] o momentarily between me and [Ramirez]."

The issue here, then, is whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists as to whether Ramirez continued to pose an immediate threat to the officers or others when Officer Granado fired six more rounds as Ramirez ran away down the street without warning. See Mason v. Lafayette City-Par. Consol. Gov 't, 806 F.3d 268, 277 (5th Cir. 2015) (reversing grant of summary judgment on qualified immunity after distinguishing between initial and subsequent shots in excessive force analysis); Roque v. Harvel, 993 F.3d 325, ,

criminal conduct before the stop. Officer Granado observed Ramirez exit from the rear-left passenger door of the suspect vehicle, demonstrating that he was not the driver and therefore not responsible for the high-speed pursuit. See TEx. TRANsP. CoDE S 545.421(a). Moreover, the characterization of the occupants as “armed and dangerous" is not itself indicative of any criminal offense and bears more directly on the second Graham factor—- whether the suspect poses an immediate threat—-rather than the severity of any crime. See Smith v. Lee, 73 F.4th 376, 385 (5th Cir. 2023). The only offense Officer Granado could reasonably attribute to Ramirez based on his observations was evading arrest on foot, which is relevant to the third Graham factor. Evading arrest, however, cannot alone justify the use of deadly force absent an objectively reasonable belief that the suspect poses an immediate threat of serious harm to officers or others. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985) ("Where the suspect poses no immediate threat to the officer and no threat to others, the harm resulting from failing to apprehend him does not justify the use of deadly force to do so."). Accordingly, our analysis turns primarily to the second Graham factor, which we recognize as the predominant factor in this inquiry. See Crane, 50 F.4th at 463.

Page 7moment can become unreasonable in the next if the justification for the use of force has ceased." Id. (quoting Lytle v. Bexar Cnty., Tex., 560 F.3d 404, 413 (5th Cir. 2009); Barnes, 145 S. Ct. at 1358 ("[T]he situation at the precise time of the shooting will often be what matters most; it is, after all, the officer's choice in that moment that is under review."). Although Officer Granado does not dispute that Ramirez was fleeing at the time of the subsequent shots, he seeks to justify his continued use of deadly force by claiming that Ramirez “was swinging his pistol in the direction of Officer Watson and [him]" as he ran.

That justification turns on two disputed material facts: (1) whether Officer Granado perceived that Ramirez was armed with a handgun, and (2) whether Ramirez, while fleeing, swung that handgun in the officers' direction. As to the first, Officer Granado was generally aware that police dispatch had advised that the suspects in the vehicle should be considered " armed and dangerous.”" And as Officer Granado exited his patrol car “with adrenaline pumping, lights flashing, confusion of the scene, the fog of danger, o i e o sy 'u e o su, noqs o undod pu Watson— who was standing next to Ramirez—-first noticed Ramirez holding a handgun at that same moment. Yet, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff-Appellant, Officer Granado's own words immediately after the shooting cast doubt on his asserted perception. Moments after firing the fatal shots, he turned to Officer Watson and asked: “did he have a gun?"4Page 8 A reasonable jury could find that this contemporaneous question sufficiently disputes Officer Granado's claim that he saw Ramirez armed before and during the shooting.

Next, contradictory evidence undermines Officer Granado's claim that Ramirez threatened the officers or swung anything in their direction as he fled. First, Officer Granado's own body-camera footage does not depict Ramirez “swinging his pistol in the direction" of either officer. Second, Officer Watson, who was closest to Ramirez, unequivocally stated that Third, the findings of Ramirez's autopsy are inconsistent with Officer Granado's account. The medical examiner concluded that each of the four bullets that struck Ramirez— including the fatal shot to the back of his head—

testimony with ^skeptical scrutiny.'" (quoting Thomas v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 233 F.3d 326, 331 (5th Cir. 200o)). In any event, we must view the summary judgment evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff-Appellant and draw all reasonable inferences in her favor. Darden, 880 F.3d at 727. Accepting Officer Granado's explanation astrue at this juncturewould turn thatstandard onitshead.

5 Officer Granado argues that Ramirez's autopsy report “actually indicates wounds in the rear right side [of his head], which is consistent with the video evidence and with Officer Granado's perception that Ramirez would have been swinging the gun toward him and Officer Watson." He cites to an investigative report by the Fort Worth Police That same report, however, notes “[aJn entrance gunshot wound to the back of the head on the right side, behind the ear[.]" The autopsy report likewise describes the path of that bullet as traveling from “right to left, back to front[.]" Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff-Appellant, that Ramirez was shot in the rear right side of his head and body is consistent with the summary judgment evidence that he fled in a southwest direction—and it is not undisputed fact that Ramirez had swung his handgun in the direction of Officers Watson and Granado. Indeed, the autopsy report tends to show that Ramirez did not turn toward the officers as he ran down the street. Had he done so, it is unlikely that he would have been shot in the back of his head and shoulders by Officer Granado.

Page 9bullets contradict the claim that Ramirez turned his torso, head, or weapon toward the officers as he fled. See Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 198 (5th Cir. 1996) ("The nature of the wounds indicate that [the suspect], was not facing [the officer] when he was shot ... rais[ing] a serious question as to the reasonableness of his conduct, more of a question of fact than a court may dispose of on summary judgment.").

In response, Officer Granado relies on the general principle that an officer need not wait “until a defendant turns towards them, with weapon in hand, before applying deadly force to ensure their safety." See, e.g., SalazarLimon v. City of Hous., 826 F.3d 272, 279 n.6 (5th Cir. 2016), as revised (June areas where a gun could be hidden out of an officer's line of sight or makes other types of furtive gestures such as suddenly reaching into their waistband. See, e.g., Ontiveros v. City of Rosenberg, Tex., 564 F.3d 379, 385 (5th Cir. 2009); Reese v. Anderson, 926 F.2d 494, 501 (5th Cir. 1991); Young v. City of Killeen, Tex., 775 F.2d 1349, 1352-53 (5th Cir. 1985). Here, Officer Granado never lost sight of Ramirez as he fled, and it is firmly disputed whether Ramirez made any threatening gestures that reasonably evince a risk to officers or others, or that Officer Granado knew Ramirez was armed at all.6

At bottom, Plaintiff-Appellant and Officer Granado offer genuinely conflicting narratives as to what occurred and what was perceived on the s ns Page 10precisely the kind of question that cannot be resolved at summary judgment. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) ("Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge[.]"). And "[o]f course, if an excessive force claim turns on which of two conflicting stories best captures what happened on the street, Graham will not permit summary judgment in favor of the defendant official." Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 216 (2001) (G1NsBURG, J., concurring). “"[I]t will be for a jury, and not judges, to resolve the[se] competing factual narratives . .. as to [Plaintiff-Appellant's] excessive-force claim.” Cole v. Carson, 935 F.3d 444, 447 (5th Cir. 2019) (en banc), as revised (Aug. 21, 2019). Plaintiff-Appellant has established genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether Officer Granado unreasonably employed deadly force against Ramirez in violation of theFourth Amendment.

The remaining issue is whether Plaintiff-Appellant's version of the disputed facts constitutes a violation of clearly established law. As we ns e q s , other justification for the use of force, it is unreasonable for a police officer to use deadly force against a fleeing felon who does not pose a sufficient threat of harm to the officer or others." 560 F.3d at 417; see also Baker, 75 F.3d at 198. Under Plaintiff-Appellant's version of the disputed facts, Officer Granado did not know Ramirez was armed, observed Ramirez flee from the officers with his back turned, and never saw Ramirez turn toward the officers during his flight. His use of deadly force in this context violates the Fourth Amendment under clearly established law.

Page 11For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the judgment of the district court and REMAND for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Page 12JAMEs L. DENNIs, Circuit Judge, concurring:

I concur in the majority opinion without reservation. I write separately to address the dissent. Despite its protestations that the majority is wrong to hold that a jury, not judges, must resolve the genuine disputes of material fact here, the dissent ignores the abundant evidence establishing those disputes. And the authority it musters? A mile-wide string of citations, with scarcely an inch deep of relevance. The dissent's error thus runs on two tracks: (A) disregarding or resolving factual disputes that belong to a jury, and (B) wrenching caselaw so far from its moorings as to strip it of all meaning.

At summary judgment, the question is not whether a judge can craft a tidy narrative from selected fragments of the record; it is whether a reasonable jury, crediting the nonmovant's evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor, could find for her. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). The dissent's account falters on three fronts: it (1) resolves competing inferences-—a job that belongs to a jury; (2) treats assertions untethered to the record as undisputed fact; and (3) omits context that materially bears on objective reasonableness.

First, the dissent makes choices among competing inferences that a jury must resolve. The dissent says that “ during the chase, " Officer Granado a d , s -iod so is heard Officer Watson state on the radio that per White Settlement PD, the (emphasis added). But the dispatch and radio transcripts in the record s interview speak to such a critical detail. ROA.576-77; ROA.582; ROA.931Page 13 ("Watson Interview") at 6:00-6:13; ROA.1013. Officer Watson pursued the vehicle only because of the driver's speeding violation. Whether Officers Watson or Granado had any information to suspect Ramirez, as a passenger, of a crime is a question for the jury at trial. The dissent also leans heavily on the compressed timeline, emphasizing that about eight seconds elapsed between Officer Granado's shout—“he's got a gun!"—and Officer Granado's final shot to Ramirez's back as he ran away. Post, at 23. But the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 657-58 (2014) (per curiam). And here, immediately after Officer have a gun?" Granado Body Camera ("GBC") at 14:55-14:56. A jury could hear that unguarded question and disbelieve that Officer Granado actually saw Ramirez holding a gun before and while shooting him in the back.

The dissent also implicitly accepts as true Officer Granado's postshooting justification for his use of deadly force: that, as Ramirez fled, he "was swinging his pistol in the direction of Officer Watson and [Officer Granado]." ROA.502 qI 14-17. The record disputes this. Officer Watson— toward me or while he was running away," and the video evidence does not ROA.594; ROA.529; GBC at 14:42-14:44. The autopsy likewise found that four bullets struck Ramirez and that each traveled through Ramirez's body from back to front, including a fatal shot to the back of his head. ROA.97576, 979. Finally, the still image reproduced below—taken from Officer Granado's body-worn camera at the moment he began firing the fatal shotsshows both officers behind Ramirez.GBC at 14:42-14:44.At the left of the frame, Officer Watson stands with his service weapon still holstered. Officer Granado is to the right of and behind Officer Watson, and Ramirez is shown Page 14fleeing with his back to both officers. This is the critical frame the dissent's cherry-picked selection omits:

Second, many of the dissent's assertions are unsupported by the finger on the trigger," post, at 22, finds no footing in the record. Neither investigative nor police reports make this claim, and the videos do not support it; they show only that Ramirez held a handgun in his left hand. ROA.524; ROA.554; ROA.588; ROA.885; GBC at 14:42-14:44.

Third, the dissent omits context that materially bears on reasonableness. The dissent says Ramirez was “involved in a high-speed, 120-mph car chase,” post, at 21, but that invites the impression that Ramirez was the driver who precipitated the pursuit. He was not. Ramirez was a Watson Dash Camera-Wide ("WDCW") at 16:16-16:20; Watson Interview at 10:40-10:50. And before the stop, nothing in the record indicates Ramirez himself was suspected of any specific crime. The dissent also notes that the chase ended in a “residential neighborhood, ” post, at 21, but the intersection Page 15where the shooting occurred—Horne Street and Houghton Avenue—was bordered by a gas station, a commercial building, a vacant lot, and one residence. The gas station and residence were located behind both officers and opposite the direction of Ramirez's flight and Officer Granado's shots. The environment the officers actually faced, and the direction Ramirez was running —- with his back turned—is less developed, context jurors may weigh in assessing objective reasonableness of Officer Granado's use of deadly force.SeeGBC at14:35-14:44.

The dissent's excerpted narrative, then, rests on disputed facts and omitted context that a jury could find decisive. We may not declare which story is true. Instead, we enforce the principle that when “an excessive force n ng as md, o mm m i o defendant official." Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 216 (2001) (G1NsBURG, J ., concurring). Applying that teaching here, the majority rightly reverses.

That leaves the dissent's citations, which serve as a reminder that one can stack citations to the ceiling, but a tower of distinguishable cases is still no foundation. All of the dissent's citations fall into two categories not n t ns overt threatening acts directed at officers; and second, cases where deadly force followed a suspect's sudden furtive reach toward a hidden area outside of the officer's line of sight that reasonably suggested the suspect was retrieving a weapon.

Unlike the present dispute, most of the cases the dissent invokes turn on overt threatening acts by suspects directed toward officers prior to their use of deadly force, e.g., raising a hammer as if to throw it at officers (City of Tahlequah), advancing toward officers while holding a knife (Kisela; Sheehan;Page 16 Dimock), pointing firearms at officers during standoffs (White; Maser; Arnold), setting a house ablaze with officers inside and charging at them with a club (Waterhouse), threatening officers with an axe or machete (Shaw; Flores), or a refusal to disarm despite explicit commands to do so by officers (Garcia; Boyd).1 Others emphasize similar conduct where the suspect Page 17possessed harmless replicas of weapons the officers believed were real (Strickland; Napouk).2 Those cases stand for a narrow and unremarkable proposition that when a suspect aims a weapon at officers or closes distance while brandishing it despite repeated commands to disarm, the Fourth Amendment ordinarily does not prohibit deadly force. The dissent attempts to apply that principle to this very different factual record that lacks the predicates driving those outcomes. Under Plaintiff-Appellant's view of the disputed facts, Ramirez never pointed his weapon at either officer, was actively fleeing with his back turned away from the officers when he was slain, and the record reflects that neither officer commanded Ramirez to stop or disarm.

Another large tranche of the dissent's laundry list rests on the “furtive reach" paradigm where a suspect refuses commands, makes overt threats, or moves toward officers while suddenly reaching or moving toward a hidden area outside of the officer's line of sight, e.g., waistband (Salazar-Limon; Batyukova; Argueta; Taylor), vehicle floorboard (Young; Reese), or console (Manis; Benton).3 Variants involve sudden gestures made by suspects Page 18following shoot-outs or armed standoffs (Franklin; Harris).4 Those decisions are animated by an officer's momentary loss of visual contact with the suspect's hands, and the movement reasonably suggested the suspect was retrieving a weapon, particularly where suspects had already demonstrated deadly intent. That is why those opinions repeatedly speak in terms of “ splitsecond" judgments about concealed threats. Again, not our facts in the present case. Officer Granado's use of deadly force against Ramirez—- who never pointed, brandished,5 or fired his weapon—-occurred during Ramirez's flight as a wide-open target across a broad street and intersection without warning. Neither officer lost sight of Ramirez, the body-camera shows no sudden reach, and the back-to-front wound paths through Ramirez's body are inconsistent with him having turned-and-aimed. Importing furtive-reach Page 19logic into these facts collapses a distinction those cases carefully preserve: unseen hand movements toward concealed areas versus continuous visual contact with a suspect intent only on running away.6

In the end, the dissent's mountain of citations cannot bear the weight it places on them. Most involve the plainest kind of immediate, overt threats to officers; the rest turn on concealed or furtive movements. None comes to grips with the facts a jury could find here. And when pressed on these gaps, d s n ss s ss Post, at 26-27. That speaks for itself.

* * *

Contrary to the dissent's characterization, today's disposition merely recognizes that when the record contains genuine conflicts about what an officer actually knew? and what the suspect actually did in the seconds before the fatal shots—conflicts borne out by contemporaneous statements, investigative reports, video footage, and physical evidence—we may not Page 20to the summary-judgment standard and to the jury's constitutional role. Accordingly, the majority opinion properly reverses the district court's grant of summary judgment to Officer Granado and remands under wellestablished principles.

Page 21ANDREW S. OLDHAM, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

Here are the undisputed (and indisputable) facts that the majority ignores or incomprehensibly denies. All material facts are captured on video:

• Estevan Ramirez was involved in a high-speed, 120-mph car chase.
• During the chase, Defendant Officer Granado learned that the vehicle occupants had been involved in drive-by shootings, and that they were armed and dangerous.
• The high-speed chase ended in a residential neighborhood.
• Ramirez jumped out of the car holding a gun.

• Page 22Ramirez's cell phone fell out of his hand, and he stooped to retrieve it phile maintaining his grip on the gun.
• Officer Granado yelled “he has a gun! He has a gun!'"
• Officer Granado's colleague was mere feet away from Ramirez when Ramirez held the gun with his finger on the trigger.

• Page 23·Officer Granado shot Ramirez.
• · From the moment Officer Granado emerged from his vehicle and shouted “he has a gun! He has a gun!" to the moment Officer Granado fired his service weapon, the entire episode was merely eight seconds.

The majority somehow holds that Officer Granado is not entitled to qualified immunity. If you've ever read one excessive-force case in the postMonroe v. Pape era, you know that is wrong. See, e.g., City of Tahlequah v. Bond, 595 U.S. 9, 11-14 (2021) (per curiam) (officers entitled to qualified immunity for shooting man holding a hammer); Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. shooting woman holding a kitchen knife); White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 78 through window after man pointed a gun at an officer); Hunter v. Cole, 580 U.S. 994, 994 (2016) (order) (vacating Fifth Circuit opinion denying qualified immunity in which officer shot teenager who was holding a gun to his head); City & Cnty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600, 605-06, 617 (2015) (officers entitled to qualified immunity for shooting a woman with a mental illness holding a kitchen knife); Barnes v. Felix, No. 22-20519, 2025 WL 2674139 (5th Cir. Sept. 18, 2025) (officer entitled to qualified immunity for shooting driver after jumping onto doorframe of driver's moving car); Argueta v. Jaradi, 86 F.4th 1084, 1087, 1094 (5th Cir. 2023) (officer entitled to qualified immunity for shooting man holding a gun), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 435 (2024); Batyukova v. Doege, 994 F.3d 717, 723, 729 (5th Cir. 2021) (officer entitled to qualified immunity for shooting unarmed suspect who walked toward officer and reached for waistband); Garcia v. Blevins, 957 F.3d 596, 602 (5th Cir. 2020) (officer entitled to qualified immunity for shooting man who refused to drop his gun); Salazar-Limon v. City ofHouston, 826 F.3d 272, 275, 279 (5th Cir. 2016) (officer entitled to qualified immunity for shooting Page 24unarmed man who allegedly made a furtive gesture toward his waistband); Thomas v. Baldwin, 595 F. App'x 378, 383 (5th Cir. 2014) (officer entitled to qualified immunity for shooting unarmed man who raised clenched hand as if holding a weapon); Clayton v. Columbia Cas. Co., 547 F. App'x 645, 653 (5th s b a ) ( s man holding a knife); Manis v. Lawson, 585 F.3d 839, 844 (5th Cir. 2009) (officer entitled to qualified immunity for shooting unarmed man who allegedly reached for something under the front seat of his vehicle); Ontiveros v. City of Rosenberg, 564 F.3d 379, 384-85 (5th Cir. 2009) (officer entitled to qualified immunity for shooting unarmed man who allegedly reached for something inside a boot); Ramire% v. Knoulton, 542 F.3d 124, 130-31 (5th Cir. 2008) (officer entitled to qualified immunity where armed suicidal man's and threatening"); Reese v. Anderson, 926 F.2d 494, 500-01 (5th Cir. 1991) (officer entitled to qualified immunity for shooting unarmed man who made no furtive gestures and merely reached down to turn off ignition in vehicle); Young v. City of Killeen, 775 F.2d 1349, 1351-53 (5th Cir. 1985) (officer entitled to qualified immunity for shooting unarmed man who allegedly reached toward floorboard of his vehicle); Bannon v. Godin, 99 F.4th 63, 8586 (1st Cir. 2024) (officers entitled to qualified immunity where suspect reached for gun in passenger seat following high-speed chase), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1048 (2025), reh'g denied, 145 S. Ct. 1347 (2025); Benton v. Layton, 139 F.4th 281, 288-92 (4th Cir. 2025) (officers entitled to qualified immunity where driver reached for gun after high-speed chase); Caraway v. City of Pineville, 111 F.4th 369, 383-84 (4th Cir. 2024) (officers entitled to qualified immunity where suspect reached for gun in his jacket pocket); Boyd v. Baeppler, 215 F.3d 594, 601-02 (6th Cir. 2000) (officer entitled to qualified immunity where suspect fled holding a pistol and disregarded police warnings to stop); Klum v. City of Davenport, 145 F.4th 907, 912-13 (8th Cir.

Page 25his own head and disregarded officers’ commands to stop); Dimock ex rel. Dimock-Heisler v. City of Brooklyn Ctr., 124 F.4th 544, 553-55 (8th Cir. 2024) (officers entitled to qualified immunity for shooting suspect holding a knife); Arnold v. McClinton, 112 F.4th 598, 604 (8th Cir. 2024) (officer entitled to 977 F.3d 687, 689 (8th Cir. 2020) (officer entitled to qualified immunity for shooting fleeing suspect even though pat-down revealed no weapons); Kong ex rel. Kong v. City of Burnsville, 960 F.3d 985, 990-93 (8th Cir. 2020) knife); Napouk v. L.V. Metro. Police Dep't, 123 F.4th 906, 914, 922-23 (9th holding a toy that resembled a knife); Cruz v. City of Deming, 138 F.4th 1257, 1264, 1271-72 (10th Cir. 2025) (officers entitled to qualified immunity when armed man began to point gun toward officers); Alcala v. Ortega, 128 F.4th 1298, 1303-04, 1313 (10th Cir. 2025) (officer entitled to qualified immunity where unarmed man pretended to brandish a gun); Waterhouse v. Direzza, 129 F.4th 1212, 1219, 1222-25 (10th Cir. 2025) (officer entitled to qualified immunity for shooting suspect he believed was armed with a club); Flores v. Henderson, 101 F.4th 1185, 1190, 1197-99 (10th Cir. 2024) (officer entitled to qualified immunity for shooting suspect armed with a machete); Arnold v. City of Olathe, 35 F.4th 778, 792-94 (10th Cir. 2022) (officers entitled to officers after hours-long standoff); Est. of Taylor v. Salt Lake City, 16 F.4th 744, 775-77 (10th Cir. 2021) (officer entitled to qualified immunity where unarmed man pretended to draw firearm from waistband); Franklin v. Popovich, 111 F.4th 1188, 1196-97 (11th Cir. 2024) (officer entitled to qualified immunity for shooting unarmed and prone suspect who moved as if to draw a gun); Harris-Billups ex rel. Harris v. Anderson, 61 F.4th 1298, 1305 (11th Cir.

Page 26reached for gun after fleeing from officers); Powell v. Snook, 25 F.4th 912, 923-25 (11th Cir. 2022) (officer entitled to qualified immunity where innocent homeowner began to raise handgun after officers arrived at the wrong house); Shaw v. City of Selma, 884 F.3d 1093, 1097-1101 (11th Cir. 2018) (officer entitled to qualified immunity for shooting man holding an axe); Montoute v. Carr, 114 F.3d 181, 185-86 (11th Cir. 1997) (officer entitled to qualified immunity for shooting suspect when suspect fled with a sawedoff shotgun and ignored command to stop); cf. Wilson v. City of Bastrop, 26 F.4th 709, 711-13 (5th Cir. 2022) (officers did not violate Fourth o q residential area); Maser v. City of Coralville, 139 F.4th 1004, 1009-10 (8th Cir. 2025) (officer did not violate Fourth Amendment by shooting suspect who refused to comply with commands and raised a gun “outward from his body" and “advanced in the general direction of officers"); Est. of Strickland v. Nevada Cnty., 69 F.4th 614, 622-23 (9th Cir. 2023) (plaintiff failed to state an excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment when officer shot

*

Judge Dennis's concurring opinion warrants three brief responses.

First, the concurrence appears to think that Officer Granado must point to some authority to justify shooting Ramirez. See ante, at 15 (DENN1S , J ., concurring) (arguing my string citation includes “distinguishable" cases). This is wrong coming and going. It is the majority, the concurrence, and Ramirez's job to point to a case that squarely governs this one. It is not mine, and it is certainly not Officer Granado's. The absence of an on-point case justice as it sees fit. See Laviage v. Fite, 47 F.4th 402, 408 (5th Cir. 2022)Page 27 ("[QJualified immunity shields officers unless existing precedent squarely governs the specific facts at issue, such that the question has been placed just how wildly off base the majority opinion is, and to show that courts routinely grant qualified immunity in circumstances that are far less dangerous than those presented here. And even if it was my job to cite a case, which it is not, I cited two that are materially indistinguishable—and the concurrence all but ignores them.

Second, having reimagined the law, the concurrence then reimagines the relevant facts. Start with the concurrence's focus on Officer Granado's written statement. Ante, at 12-13 (DENNIs, J., concurring). The concurrence claims the record undermines Officer Granado's statement Watson" told him Ramirez's vehicle “had been involved in drive-by Page 28shootings.” Ibid. That is an astonishingly irrelevant quibble: Even if Officer Watson didn't tell him that, LWPD dispatch certainly “informed [him] that the suspect vehicle had previously fled from police and that its occupants should be considered ^armed and dangerous.'" Ante, at 5 n.2 (majority opinion) (emphasis added); ROA.554-55; ROA.576-77; ROA.582; ROA.931 (Officer Watson Interview) at 6:00-6:13; ROA.1013. It could not possibly matter less whether Officer Watson told him the occupants had been involved in drive-by shootings. All that matters is that Officer Granado learned the fact; Officer Granado testified that he learned the fact before the shooting; and there is not a single scintilla of evidence to suggest Officer Granado was lying. The Other assertions in the concurrence are flatly untrue. I have never "implicitly accept[ed] as true" Officer Granado's claim that Ramirez was "swinging his pistol" at Officers Granado and Watson. Ante, at 13 (DENN1s, J., concurring) (quotation omitted). Nor did I misconstrue the in the vehicle or that a “gas station," business, or “vacant lot" were located on adjoining streets. Id. at 14-15. These facts are completely irrelevant to me—and to the qualified immunity question. See Argueta, 86 F.4th at 108789, 93 (whether Argueta “raised the gun" at officers as he fled toward “a vacant lot”" was “immaterial"); Wilson, 26 F.4th at 715-16 (officers lawfully used deadly force when they shot passenger who fled with a weapon).

Third and finally, I do have one compliment for the concurrence: It says the quiet part out loud. The concurrence says that this case turns on "what an officer actually knew." Ante, at 19 (DENNIs, J., concurring). Again: wrong. “"[GJenuine conflicts about what an officer actually knew and what the suspect actually did in the seconds before the fatal shots" are irrelevant if no clearly established law forbids the officer's conduct under either version of the facts. Ibid. And the majority and concurrence point to Page 29zero cases that would justify denying qualified immunity under these “ disputed’" facts—-other than citing the “ general principle that deadly force requires a sufficient threat." Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 14 (2015) (per curiam); see ante, at 10 (majority opinion) ("[1]t has long been clearly established that, absent any other justification for the use of force, it is unreasonable for a police officer to use deadly force against a fleeing felon who does not pose a sufficient threat of harm to the officer or others." (quotation omitted)).

We've made this mistake before. Our court has previously denied qualified immunity by second-guessing whether the facts an officer “actually kn[e]w" created a “sufficient threat of harm to the officer or others" to justify deadly force. See Luna v. Mullenix, 773 F.3d 712, 720-25 (5th Cir. 2014), rev 'd summarily, 577 U.S.⁷ (2015) (per curiam). That inversion of the qualified immunity standard warranted summary reversal then. And 1 respectfully submit it also does now.

For the police officers in our circuit who confront armed-anddangerous felons fleeing drive-by shootings, who have mere seconds to make split-second life-and-death decisions in the middle of the night, and who hope to get home safely to their families and then also survive this court's frameby-frame NFL-style instant replay review: Today's decision will make your already-hard jobs much harder.

I respectfully dissent.