2026-1063

Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims in No. 23-4348, Judge Joseph L. Falvey, Jr., Judge Joseph L. Toth, Judge Scott Laurer.

Decided: September 3, 2026

CHARLES GLEN LOOMIS, Richmond Hill, GA, pro se.

BORISLAV KUSHNIR, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, argued for respondent-appellee. Also represented by ERIC P. BRUSKIN, BRENDAN D. JORDAN, PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY, BRETT A. SHUMATE; MICHELLE BERNSTEIN, Y. KEN LEE, Office of General Counsel, United States Department of Veterans Affairs, Washington, DC.

Page 2CLAIRE A. FUNDAKOWSKI, Winston Taylor LLP, Washington, DC, argued as amicus curiae.

Before MOORE, Chief Judge , CUNNINGHAM, Circuit Judge , and SUBRAMANIAN, District Judge . 1

SUBRAMANIAN, District Judge .

Charles Loomis served in the United States Air Force for 20 years. Upon his retirement from the service in February 2015, he needed a pilot certification for a job as a sensor operator. When he sought to cover the cost of a flight training class with educational assistance benefits, his application was denied by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), and the denial was upheld on appeal by the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims.

On appeal, Mr. Loomis challenges that court's interpretation of two statutes and their associated regulations. We affirm.

Claimant-appellant Charles Loomis served in the Air Force from 1995 to 2015. Dkt. 9 at 32. Following his service, he joined General Atomics as a field service representative. Id. Mr. Loomis wanted to become a sensor operator, but General Atomics required him to first earn a pilot certification. Id.

To pay for the certification, Mr. Loomis applied for educational assistance benefits from the VA to cover his training course at MidCoast Aviation Services, LLC (MidCoast). Id. at 33. In support of his application, Mr. Loomis Page 3submitted a certificate from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) authorizing MidCoast to operate a provisional pilot school with a private pilot course. Id.

The VA denied Mr. Loomis’s application, and the Board of Veterans' Appeals affirmed the denial. Id. The Board acknowledged that Mr. Loomis had a basic entitlement to educational assistance benefits. Id. But because MidCoast was not recognized as an educational institution of higher learning (IHL) and Mr. Loomis was not taking the course in pursuit of a college degree, it concluded that the law did not permit Mr. Loomis to obtain benefits for the course. Id. at 31–34.

A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims affirmed. Id. at 32. The majority held that Mr. Loomis was foreclosed from receiving benefits for the course because MidCoast was not affiliated with an IHL. Id. The majority relied on 38 U.S.C. § 3680A(b), which prohibits the approval of a veteran’s enrollment in a flight training course “other than one given by an educational institution of higher learning for credit toward a standard college degree the eligible veteran is seeking.”

Judge Laurer dissented. Id. at 52–56. He read the law to allow benefits to be used for FAA-approved flight training courses regardless of IHL affiliation. Id. at 56. Judge Laurer relied on a different statute, 38 U.S.C. § 3672(b)(2)(A)(ii), which provides that “[a] flight training course approved by the Federal Aviation Administration that is offered by a certified pilot school that possesses a valid Federal Aviation Administration pilot school certificate” is “deemed . . . approved.”

Page 4Mr. Loomis appealed pro se . 2

On this appeal, the question is how to reconcile Sections 3672(b)(2)(A)(ii) and 3680A(b).

“The United States has a proud history of offering educational assistance to millions of veterans, as demonstrated by the many ‘G. I. Bills’ enacted since World War II.” Rudisill v. McDonough , 601 U.S. 294, 298-99 (2024) (quoting Post-9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance Act of 2008, § 5002(3), 122 Stat. 2358, 38 U.S.C. § 3301 et seq. ). But the resources for educational assistance to veterans, like all government resources, are finite, so Congress has limited the educational programs for which veterans can receive benefits. Mindful of Congress’s careful consideration of the types of education that are covered, we consider whether the VA was required to cover Mr. Loomis’s MidCoast course.

Our review is guided by a pair of statutes. The first, 38 U.S.C. § 3672, is titled “Approval of courses.” In the circumstances presented by this case, a course is eligible for benefits 'only if' it 'is approved . . . by the State approving agency for the State where such educational institution is located, or by the Secretary.'³ 38 U.S.C. § 3672(a). In some Page 5instances, that approval may be constructive rather than express. For instance:

Subject to section[] . . . 3680A . . . of this title, a program of education is deemed to be approved for purposes of this chapter if a State approving agency, or the Secretary when acting in the role of a State approving agency, determines that the program is . . . [a] flight training course approved by the Federal Aviation Administration that is offered by a certified pilot school that possesses a valid Federal Aviation Administration pilot school certificate .

38 U.S.C. § 3672(b)(2)(A)(ii) (emphases added).

Section 3680A, in turn, is titled “Disapproval of enrollment in certain courses.” It prohibits the Secretary from approving a veteran’s enrollment in several types of educational programs, such as any “bartending course” or any course that is “avocational or recreational in character.” 38 U.S.C. § 3680A(a)(1), (3). Relevant here, it states:

Except to the extent otherwise specifically provided in this title or chapter 106 of title 10, the Secretary shall not approve the enrollment of an eligible veteran in any course of flight training other than one given by an educational institution of higher learning for credit toward a standard college degree the eligible veteran is seeking .

38 U.S.C. § 3680A(b) (emphases added).

The disagreement between Mr. Loomis and the Secretary rests on how to reconcile these two statutes.

Mr. Loomis argues that Section 3672(b)(2)(A)(ii) is an exception to Section 3680A(b)'s IHL requirement. He points to the carveout in Section 3680A(b), which states that the statute applies “[e]xcept to the extent otherwise specifically provided in this title.”

Page 6Under Mr. Loomis’s reading, if a flight training course is approved by the FAA and offered by a certified pilot school (per Section 3672(b)(2)(A)(ii)), it doesn't matter whether the course is given by an IHL for the pursuit of a college degree (per Section 3680A(b)). As for the proviso in Section 3672(b)(2)(A) that it is “[s]ubject to section[] . . . 3680A,” Mr. Loomis reads that as incorporating all of the other restrictions in Section 3680A (which, among other things, would bar the use of benefits for a recreational flight course) but not Section 3680A(b).

The Secretary disagrees with this reading. He argues that Section 3680A(b) bars the approval of a veteran’s enrollment in any flight training course unless it is given by an IHL and counts toward a veteran’s college degree. The Secretary maintains that Section 3672(b)(2)(A)(ii) doesn’t “specifically provide[]” otherwise, as Section 3680A(b) requires. Indeed, the Secretary observes, Section 3672(b)(2)(A) makes clear that its provisions are “subject to” Section 3680A, which can only be understood to include the IHL requirement.

“[W]e start where we always do: with the text of the statute.” Van Buren v. United States , 593 U.S. 374, 381 (2021). Where a statute’s text is clear, we need not look any further in determining its meaning. See Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain , 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992).

We begin with Section 3672. As relevant here, that statute establishes that as a precondition to a veteran receiving benefits for “a course of education offered by an educational institution,' the course must receive approval from the Secretary or the state where the institution is located. 38 U.S.C. § 3672(a).

Section 3672(b)(2)(A)(ii) provides that a flight training course is “deemed . . . approved” where, “[s]ubject to” Section 3680A (and other statutes not relevant here), the state Page 7or Secretary determines that the course is “approved by the Federal Aviation Administration [and] is offered by a certified pilot school that possesses a valid Federal Aviation Administration pilot school certificate.”

As the “[s]ubject to” clause suggests, course approval under Section 3672 isn’t the end of the story. While any course must be approved for a veteran to be eligible to enroll using benefits, there are nevertheless further requirements for some kinds of courses. That takes us to Section 3680A.

That statute is titled '[d]isapproval of enrollment in certain courses,” and it describes situations where the Secretary “shall not approve the enrollment of an eligible veteran.” One of those limitations is that “the Secretary shall not approve the enrollment of an eligible veteran in any course of flight training other than one given by an educational institution of higher learning for credit toward a standard college degree the eligible veteran is seeking.' Id. § 3680A(b). That prohibition applies “[e]xcept to the extent otherwise specifically provided” in Title 38 (or Chapter 106 of Title 10, which is not at issue here). Id.

The question is whether Section 3672(b)(2)(A)(ii) “specifically provide[s]” that approval may be granted even if Section 3680A(b)’s requirements are not satisfied. The answer is no.

Section 3672(b)(2)(A)(ii) doesn’t expressly set aside the IHL requirement, and it also doesn’t use the kind of language one would expect to see if it were an exception: “In addition to,” “As an exception to,” “Notwithstanding,” etc. Just the opposite, Section 3672(b)(2)(A)(ii) is “[s]ubject to” Section 3680A. And being “subject to” a statute means being “subordinate” to or “governed or affected by” its provisions. Subject To , Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990).

Page 8So when Section 3672(b)(2)(A) says that its provisions are '[s]ubject to' Section 3680A, it confirms that Section 3680A provides additional requirements for eligibility. And that makes sense given the statutory structure: Section 3672(a) states that a veteran shall receive benefits “only if” the desired course is “approved,” but that leaves open the possibility of further restrictions (whether governing course approval itself or enrollment more generally).

What’s more is that Mr. Loomis’s contrary argument— that Section 3672(b)(2)(A)(ii) independently authorizes the payment of benefits-conflicts with another statute, 38 U.S.C. § 3034(d). As discussed further below, Section 3034(d) provides an express exception to Section 3680A(b). It states that “[t]he Secretary may approve” flight training not given by an IHL if, unlike Mr. Loomis, a veteran already has a private pilot certificate and the courses satisfy certain other requirements. One of those requirements is that “the flight school courses are approved by the [FAA] and are offered by a certified pilot school that possesses a valid [FAA] pilot school certificate.” Id . § 3034(d)(3). Of course, that matches the text of Section 3672(b)(2)(A)(ii). But if Section 3672(b)(2)(A)(ii) alone authorizes the payment of benefits, regardless of whether a veteran already has a pilot certificate, then Section 3034(d) is a nullity. This underscores that course approval under Section 3672(b)(2)(A)(ii) is the starting point, not the end, of the benefits determination.

Taken together, Sections 3672 and 3680A provide as follows. A course must receive approval of the Secretary or the state in which the school sits. If it is determined that a flight training course is FAA-approved and provided at a certified pilot school, then it is “deemed . . . approved.” Id. § 3672(b)(2)(A)(ii). But such a course still must be given by an IHL as part of a veteran’s college degree program. Id. § 3680A(b). Since there is no dispute that the MidCoast course fails the IHL requirement, we agree with the Court Page 9of Appeals for Veterans Claims that Mr. Loomis is ineligible for coverage.

C

Mr. Loomis and Judge Laurer’s dissent below raise two thoughtful counterarguments, but they do not counsel a different interpretation of these statutes.

First , we consider whether our interpretation of the statutes renders Section 3672(b)(2)(A)(ii) superfluous. Why allow for the approval of courses at FAA-approved schools if the IHL requirement nevertheless applies?

This objection appears to rest on the implicit assumption that FAA-approved pilot schools are never themselves IHLs, and so no course could satisfy both Section 3672(b)(2)(A)(ii) and Section 3680A(b). But that assumption is incorrect. As the majority below noted, and Mr. Loomis doesn’t dispute, the FAA licenses pilot schools that are part of IHLs. Dkt. 9 at 45. The FAA's website shows that many IHLs are licensed as Part 141 pilot schools, such as the University of Oklahoma and The Ohio State University, just to name two. See AVInfo Find a Facility Dashboard , Fed. Aviation Admin., https://www.faa.gov/av-info/facility-dashboard (last visited September 2, 2026) (to find a pilot school, click on “PART 141 PILOT SCHOOL,” type in a ZIP code, press the enter key, and click “See/Download Contact Information”). That alone defeats the surplusage argument.

And even if most FAA-approved flight training courses are not offered directly by an IHL, Section 3680A(b) might still be satisfied where an IHL contracts with a private pilot school. The VA has permitted such an arrangement in its governing regulations. See 38 C.F.R. § 21.4233(e) (permitting '[a]ll or part of the program of education of a school” to be “provided by another school or entity under contract,' with contracted flight training courses having Page 10the additional requirement that they be approved by the FAA).⁴

Second , Mr. Loomis argues that the Secretary's reading would render the “[e]xcept” clause of Section 3680A(b) superfluous. As he sees it, Congress explicitly contemplated exceptions to the IHL requirement, and Section 3672(b)(2)(A)(ii)’s allowance for FAA-approved courses is precisely that.

While it is true that Section 3680A(b) allows for exceptions where another statute 'otherwise specifically provide[s],' Section 3672(b)(2)(A)(ii) doesn't do so. Instead, that statute is “[s]ubject to” Section 3680A’s requirements. 38 U.S.C. § 3672(b)(2)(A).

By contrast, Section 3034(d), discussed above, explicitly notes that it allows for courses 'in addition to' what may be approved under Section 3680A(b). Id. § 3034(d) (allowing the Secretary to approve a flight training course for veterans who already have a private pilot license “in addition to a course of flight training that may be approved under section 3680A(b)”). Section 3034(d), therefore, “specifically provides” for an exception to Section 3680A(b)’s IHL requirement. So our interpretation does not render the “[e]xcept” clause in Section 3680A(b) superfluous.

Mr. Loomis argues that Section 3034(d) is a red herring. He highlights that in 1990, the precursor to Section 3034(d)—38 U.S.C. § 1434(d)(1) (1990)—contained thePage 11 “in addition to” language referenced above. But the precursor to Section 3680A(b) in effect at that time did not contain an “[e]xcept” clause. Id. § 1673(b) (1990).

Based on this history, Mr. Loomis asks why Congress would have added an “[e]xcept” clause to Section 3680A(b) to address an exception that already existed. This argument, however, overlooks that 'Congress may amend a statute simply to clarify existing law.” Hawkins v. United States , 30 F.3d 1077, 1082 (9th Cir. 1994). Here, Congress may have included the “[e]xcept” clause in Section 3680A(b) to resolve the clear conflict that had previously existed—one statute saying that the Secretary may approve courses that do not satisfy the IHL requirement (Section 3034(d)’s predecessor) and one saying the Secretary may not do so (Section 3680A(b)’s predecessor).

Superfluity issues aside, Mr. Loomis's reading is untenable given Section 3672(b)(2)(A)(ii)’s text. Under Mr. Loomis’s interpretation, while this provision is “[s]ubject to . . . section 3680A,' Section 3680A(b) is implicitly carved out. There is no textual justification for that reading. We reject the notion that, without explanation, Section 3672(b)(2)(A)(ii) is only subject to some of Section 3680A's prohibitions (e.g., that a veteran cannot use their benefits for recreational courses, see 38 U.S.C. § 3680A(a)(3)) but not the only prohibition relating specifically to flight training courses.

Under Section 3672(b)(2)(A)(ii), FAA-approved courses at certified pilot schools are deemed approved. But the receipt of benefits is subject to Section 3680A(b)’s further requirement that any flight training course be given by an IHL and count toward a veteran’s college degree. As a result, Mr. Loomis is ineligible to receive benefits for the flight training course at MidCoast.

Page 12Mr. Loomis separately challenges several regulations as conflicting with the statutes addressed in this opinion. The majority below said that Mr. Loomis 'may have a point” and “might be right” about the regulations’ invalidity, Dkt. 9 at 32, 51, but it ultimately concluded that the issue was irrelevant given that his application for benefits was foreclosed by statute.

We agree. Mr. Loomis is ineligible for benefits by statute, and so any irregularity in the regulations causes him no injury and warrants no relief.⁵

No costs.