Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 1:21-cv-04682 — Jorge L. Alonso , Judge .

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 5, 2025 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 3, 2026

Before ST. EVE, JACKSON-AKIWUMI, and LEE, Circuit Judges .

JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge . Brian Caraba, a dentist, applied for benefits through his individual disability insurance policy after his hip and back became impaired. His insurer, The Paul Revere Insurance Company, paid out benefits for more than a year pending complete review of his claim. During that time, Caraba received income from part-time teaching positions and from performing duties for two professional dental associations. Upon learning of this income, Page 2Paul Revere terminated Caraba’s benefits, finding that he was working in a “gainful occupation” and thus did not meet the policy’s definition of “total disability.” Caraba sued Paul Revere for breach of contract and sought penalties against the company under the Illinois Insurance Code, 215 ILCS 5/155, which allows for additional damages where the insurance company acted in bad faith. After considering the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court ruled in Paul Revere’s favor. The district court held that the meaning of “gainful occupation” as used in the policy was not ambiguous and the undisputed factual record demonstrated Caraba was gainfully employed. We affirm.

We review a district court’s decisions on cross motions for summary judgment de novo. Markel Ins. Co. v. Rau , 954 F.3d 1012, 1016 (7th Cir. 2020). 'With cross summary judgment motions, we construe all facts and inferences therefrom in favor of the party against whom the motion under consideration is made.” Id. (citation modified). Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

To receive disability benefits from Paul Revere, Caraba needed to meet the definition of “total disability” provided in his policy:

'Total Disability' means that because of Injury or Sickness:

a. You are unable to perform the important duties of Your Occupation; and

b. You are not engaged in any other gainful occupation; and

Page 3c. You are receiving Physician's Care. We will waive this requirement if We receive written proof acceptable to Us that further Physician’s Care would be of no benefit to You.

As in district court, Caraba’s challenge on appeal turns on the second requirement and the meaning of the term “gainful occupation.' To that end, Caraba argues that Paul Revere wrongfully denied him benefits because it incorrectly concluded his part-time teaching and professional association work constituted “gainful occupation.”

Because this case comes to the federal courts under diversity jurisdiction and the parties do not raise a choice-of-law issue, we apply substantive law from the State of Illinois. Selective Ins. Co. of S.C. v. Target Corp. , 845 F.3d 263, 266 (7th Cir. 2016). Under Illinois law, an insurance policy and its terms are interpreted using the same rules as those for interpreting other types of contracts. Levy v. Minn. Life Ins. Co. , 517 F.3d 519, 523 (7th Cir. 2008). Here, that is the “four corners” rule: “[a]n agreement, when reduced to writing, must be presumed to speak the intention of the parties who signed it. It speaks for itself, and the intention with which it was executed must be determined by the language used. It is not to be changed by extrinsic evidence.” Camico Mut. Ins. Co. v. Citizens Bank , 474 F.3d 989, 992–93 (7th Cir. 2007) (citation modified). Because “the goal of contract interpretation is to ascertain the parties’ intent … we first look to the plain and ordinary meaning of the contract language.” Selective Ins. Co. , 845 F.3d at 267 (citation modified). 'If the language of the contract is clear and unambiguous, we interpret the contract without the use of parol evidence.” Camico Mut. Ins. Co. , 474 F.3d at 993. A term is ambiguous “only if [it is] susceptible to more than one Page 4reasonable interpretation.” Levy , 517 F.3d at 523. But “we will not artificially create ambiguity where none exists.' Hammond v. Fid. & Guar. Life Ins. Co. , 965 F.2d 428, 430 (7th Cir. 1992) (citation modified).

Here, the meaning of “gainful occupation” as used in the policy is not ambiguous. As we explained in Hammond , disability policies generally fall within one of two classifications: “occupational” and “general.” Id. at 430. 'An 'occupational' disability policy provides benefits if the claimant is unable to perform his regular job; a ‘general’ disability policy provides benefits if the claimant is unable to perform any job for which he is qualified by reason of education, training or experience.” Id. at 430–31. A claimant need not “be utterly helpless to be considered disabled” under a general disability policy. Id. at 431. “Rather, the insured should be entitled to recover provided he or she is unable to perform all the substantial and material acts necessary to the prosecution of some gainful business or occupation.” Id.

When read as a whole, the definition of “total disability” in Caraba’s policy with Paul Revere unequivocally qualifies the policy as a “general” disability policy. The policy requires not only Caraba’s inability to perform his regular occupation but also prohibits his engagement with any other occupation. Accordingly, to receive disability benefits, Caraba was required to show that he could not make a reasonable living from any job for which he was qualified, not just his prior occupation as a dentist. See EMPLOYMENT, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining 'gainful employment' as “[w]ork that a person can pursue and perform for money”); see also Ghazi v. Fiserv, Inc. , 957 F. Supp. 167, 169 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (“‘Gainful’ means ‘any occupation from which [the insured Page 5can] earn a reasonably substantial income rising to the dignity of an income or livelihood.'' (quoting Helms v. Monsanto Co., 728 F.2d 1416, 1421-22 (11th Cir. 1984))).

The record at summary judgment establishes that Caraba cannot make the requisite showing. In 2018, before he stopped working in his dental practice, Caraba earned approximately $141,000, of which nearly $69,000 was from his teaching and consulting work. In 2019, when he stopped working as a dentist, Caraba's income dropped to $70,000, all from his nonclinical work, and then to $67,000 in 2020. In light of this income, Caraba did not meet the definition of “total disability” under the policy, and Paul Revere did not breach the policy by denying Caraba benefits on that basis.

Caraba’s arguments on appeal are unavailing. He argues that his policy qualifies as an “occupational” disability policy, not a “general” disability policy. But if Caraba were correct, 'Your Occupation' and 'any other gainful occupation' would have the same meaning, which would render the second requirement superfluous. See Levy , 517 F.3d at 523 (cautioning against adopting “strained, forced, unnatural, or unreasonable construction[s]” of contract terms or “one[s] which would lead to an absurd result” (citation modified)); Selective Ins. Co. , 845 F.3d at 267 (explaining that in interpreting contract provisions, courts “must seek to give effect to each clause and word used, without rendering any terms meaningless”).

Caraba also argues that a “gainful occupation” is one that pays “at least 60% of pre-disability earnings.” But he draws this 60% figure from a section of Paul Revere’s claims manual that applies to group long-term disability and life insurance policies. This claims manual is far outside the “four corners” of the policy at issue. And as the district court explained in its Page 6order, Caraba’s post-disability income was still higher than that of the median wage in Illinois, which reinforces that Caraba was still able to earn a reasonable living so as to be gainfully employed.

At bottom, Caraba asks that we inject ambiguity into a policy term where none is present and then construe that term in a light most favorable to him. But “[a] policy term is not ambiguous because the term is not defined within the policy or because the parties can suggest creative possibilities for its meaning.” Lapham-Hickey Steel Corp. v. Prot. Mut. Ins. Co. , 655 N.E.2d 842, 846 (Ill. 1995). Nor can a court “read an ambiguity into a policy just to find in favor of the insured.' Id. The meaning of “gainful occupation” is not ambiguous on the face of the policy, and the record indisputably shows Caraba received income after the onset of his disability. Therefore, Paul Revere did not breach the terms of the policy by denying Caraba benefits on the basis that he did not meet the definition of “total disability.” And there being no breach, Caraba’s claim that Paul Revere acted in bad faith in violation of the Illinois Insurance Code necessarily fails as well.

For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Paul Revere and AFFIRM its denial of summary judgment to Caraba.